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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has 
become one of the most important, if not the most important, issue on 
security and foreign policy agendas at the beginning of the twenty-
first century.  Iraq’s alleged pursuit and possession of WMD domi-
nated the international security agenda from President Bush’s speech 
to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in September 2002,1 
through UN Security Council Resolution 1441 providing Iraq one last 
opportunity to comply with previous Security Council Resolutions,2 
and culminating in the U.S. and British invasion of Iraq in March 
2003.  Through the Bush Doctrine,3 the world’s leading political and 
military power has made WMD a centerpiece of a new strategic doc-
trine designed to guide the assessment of national security threats and 
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 1. See George W. Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York 
City, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1529, 1530–32 (Sept. 12, 2002), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2003). 
 2. See S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4644th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1441 
(2002). 
 3. The Bush Doctrine, previously referred to as the “axis of evil,” was first enunciated by 
President Bush during his State of the Union Address in January 2002.  See George W. Bush, 
Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 38 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 133, 135 (Jan. 29, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2002/01/20020129-11.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2003) (“States like these and their terrorist allies 
constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. . . . I will not wait on events 
while dangers gather.  I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer.”) [hereinafter State of 
the Union Address]. 
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the application of U.S. power.4  As illustrated by the Bush Doctrine, 
the WMD threat includes possession of these weapons by not only 
states but also terrorist groups, leading to fears about the rise of cata-
strophic terrorism5—fears exacerbated by the historic terrorist attacks 
against the United States on September 11, 2001.  The U.S.-led mili-
tary action against Iraq represented the application of the Bush Doc-
trine against the WMD-centered “axis of evil.”  Significant security 
concerns about WMD have also developed and grown more alarming 
with regard to North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability6 and Iran’s 
possible nuclear weapons program.7 
These recent developments involving the threat posed by WMD 
reflect a trend in the security area stretching back more than a dec-
ade.  The end of the Cold War sparked a host of concerns regarding 
WMD in the hands of rogue states and terrorists, forcing policy mak-
ers, scholars, and pundits to assess the seriousness of the WMD threat 
and construct responses designed to address it.8  The Bush Doctrine 
and the war against Iraq are the latest, and the most dramatic, policy 
moves by the United States to address the perceived WMD peril. 
The rise in the prominence of WMD on security and foreign pol-
icy agendas in the 1990s and early 2000s raises questions about the 
role of international law in this area.  International law has a long re-
lationship with efforts to control WMD that began as early as the late 
 
 4. See WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 14 
(2002) (“We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are 
able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and 
friends.”) [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY]; see also WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL 
STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 1 (2002) (“Weapons of mass de-
struction (WMD)—nuclear, biological, and chemical—in the possession of hostile states and 
terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States.”) [hereinaf-
ter WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION]. 
 5. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 4, at 6 (“Our immediate focus will be 
those terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist group or state sponsor of terror-
ism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors;”); 
WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM 9 (2003) (“Weapons of 
mass destruction pose a direct and serious threat to the United States and the entire interna-
tional community.  The probability of a terrorist organization using a chemical, biological, radio-
logical, or nuclear weapon . . . has increased significantly during the past decade.”) [hereinafter 
COMBATING TERRORISM]. 
 6. See generally Nuclear Threat Initiative, North Korea Nuclear Program Overview: 
History and Status, at http://www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/nuc/cap/NKN_OGO.html (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2003). 
 7. See generally Nuclear Threat Initiative, Iran Profile, at http://www.nti.org/e_research/ 
profiles/Iran/index.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2003). 
 8. See, e.g., RICHARD A. FALKENRATH ET AL., AMERICA’S ACHILLES’ HEEL: NUCLEAR, 
BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL TERRORISM AND COVERT ATTACK (1998). 
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nineteenth century with the development of treaty prohibitions on 
the use of poisonous gas in warfare.9  As the International Court of 
Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nu-
clear Weapons illustrates,10 three bodies of international law regulate 
WMD: arms control treaties, international law on the use of force, 
and international humanitarian law.  Historically, the most prominent 
and direct use of international law in connection with WMD was 
through arms control treaties—international agreements designed to 
prohibit or limit the development, possession, and use of nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons by states.11  As Table 1 shows, only 
arms control treaties specifically address the development and use of 
WMD.  Through such treaties, states and international organizations 
crafted a body of international law dealing directly with the control of 
WMD. 
Table 1. 
International Law’s Application to the Development and Use of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 
Area of  
International 
Law 
Development  
of WMD 
Use of WMD 
International 
law on the use 
of force 
Addresses the threat or 
use of force, not the de-
velopment of weapons 
Establishes legal justifications 
for the resort to force, not rules 
on what weapons states may use 
International 
humanitarian 
law 
Does not directly  
regulate the  
development of weapons 
Disciplines generally the kinds 
of weapons that can be used in 
armed conflict (e.g., no use of 
weapons that cause superfluous 
injury or unnecessary suffering) 
Arms control 
treaties 
Specifically regulate the 
development of WMD 
Prohibit the use of chemical 
and biological weapons 
 
 9. Declaration Concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Projectiles Diffusing Asphyxiat-
ing Gases, July 29, 1899, reprinted in A MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
AND ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS 99 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2000) [hereinafter Hague 
Declaration]. 
 10. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, 244–47, 247–53, 256–60 (July 8) (analyzing international law on the use of force, rele-
vant arms control treaties, and analyzing humanitarian law). 
 11. See, e.g., Hague Declaration, supra note 9; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in 
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 
June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol]. 
091504 FIDLER.DOC 10/18/2004  9:56 AM 
42 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 14:39 
This body of international law reflects the “arms control ap-
proach” to WMD—formal agreements among states to regulate the 
use and development of WMD.  According to Kellman, the arms con-
trol approach comprises “measures to cope with a dangerous threat to 
international security: vertical and horizontal weapons proliferation 
among national militaries, with concomitant acceleration of both the 
likelihood that war among nations will erupt and that, if and when 
war does break out, the consequences will be catastrophic.”12  The 
arms control approach had origins in international humanitarian law’s 
prohibition of the use of weapons that cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering,13 but the approach created an area of interna-
tional law distinct from the laws of war because it developed a body 
of rules that applied prior to the outbreak of armed conflict. 
The growth of concerns about WMD proliferation and their pos-
sible use by states and non-state actors has put the arms control ap-
proach to WMD under intense scrutiny, producing controversy about 
what arms control treaties on WMD contribute to national security 
and international peace.  Bitter international controversies about the 
effectiveness of UN WMD inspections in Iraq and the legitimacy of 
preemptive self-defense against states that possess or pursue WMD 
suggest that the arms control approach has failed to provide an effec-
tive strategy for dealing with the contemporary WMD threat.14 
The problems confronting the arms control approach to WMD 
are more extensive than references to controversies about UN inspec-
tions and preemptive self-defense indicate.  Skepticism and opposi-
tion have dogged the arms control approach during its history be-
cause many experts expressed doubts about the efficacy of this 
strategy in controlling threats to security in international politics.15  
 
 12. Barry Kellman, An International Criminal Law Approach to Bioterrorism, 25 HARV. J. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 721, 724 (2002). 
 13. The Hague Declaration states that its prohibition of the diffusion of asphyxiating gases 
was “inspired by the sentiments which found expression in the Declaration of St. Petersburg 
of . . . 1868.”  Hague Declaration, supra note 9, at 99.  Under the St. Petersburg Declaration, 
states parties renounced the use in war of explosive projectiles weighing less than 400 grams un-
der the principle that the use of “arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, 
or render their death inevitable . . . would . . . be contrary to the laws of humanity.”  Declaration 
Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, 
Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted in A MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ARMS 
CONTROL AGREEMENTS, supra note 9, at 85, 85–86. 
 14. For analyses of the international legal implications of the use of force against Iraq, see 
Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 553 (2003). 
 15. See, e.g., MALCOM WALLOP & ANGELO M. CODEVILLA, THE ARMS CONTROL 
DELUSION (1987).  The arms control approach has been criticized on other grounds as well.  
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This article explores the controversy about the role of arms control 
treaties on WMD in the new security and foreign policy environment 
of the early twenty-first century.  After presenting an analytical 
framework for evaluating the threat of WMD, I argue that recent de-
velopments demonstrate that we are witnessing the end of the arms 
control approach to the WMD problem.  By the end of the arms con-
trol approach, I mean that (1) the traditional reliance on arms control 
treaties as a response to WMD threats is proving inadequate and (2) 
policy-makers are increasingly turning away from this traditional ap-
proach in crafting responses to the WMD threat. 
The end of the arms control approach does not mean the end of 
arms control, because the relevant treaties remain part of the process 
of addressing the WMD threat.  These treaties no longer represent, 
however, the dominant policy and legal approach to WMD.  At the 
heart of this argument is the assertion that underlying political, tech-
nological, and social realities have changed so significantly that the 
traditional arms control approach to WMD no longer holds center 
stage politically or legally. 
II.  THE THREAT FROM WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. The Analytical Framework: Interdependent WMD Risk Factors 
The increased attention WMD have received in the 1990s and 
early 2000s in policy circles prompts the question why WMD have be-
come significant security and foreign policy concerns.  Answering this 
question requires understanding WMD risk factors and how percep-
tions about these risk factors have changed in recent years.  Con-
structing an analytical framework for assessing the gravity of the 
WMD threat is difficult for many reasons, including the tendency to 
 
See, e.g., Richard A. Falk, Nuclear Weapons, International Law and the World Court: A Historic 
Encounter, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 64, 65 (1997) (criticizing reliance on the arms control approach in 
the context of nuclear weapons as leading “to a repudiation of general and complete disarma-
ment as a policy goal, and an unwillingness to submit or consider nuclear disarmament propos-
als as a basis for international negotiations”).  Other experts have argued that the arms control 
approach is not appropriate for certain kinds of new weapons technologies.  See, e.g., Kellman, 
supra note 12, at 729 (arguing that the problem of bioterrorism “does not lend itself to an arms 
control approach”); Greg Rattray, The Emerging Global Information Infrastructure and Na-
tional Security, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer/Fall 1997, at 81, 90 (1997) (arguing that the 
arms control approaches developed during the Cold War “will not work in controlling the tools 
necessary for strategic information attacks”). 
091504 FIDLER.DOC 10/18/2004  9:56 AM 
44 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 14:39 
The WMD Threat:
An Analytical Framework
Political/Military
Motivations
Technological
Feasibility
Social
Vulnerabilities
WMD
Threat
lump together nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons—distinct 
technologies that pose dramatically different kinds of policy chal-
lenges—under the single moniker “weapons of mass destruction.”  
Even with limitations, however, an analytical framework provides in-
sight into the nature of the threat and the various policy responses at-
tempted or proposed. 
The nature of the WMD threat reflects the interdependence of 
three basic risk factors: (1) political and military motivations of actors 
for developing or using WMD; (2) the technological feasibility of de-
veloping or using WMD; and (3) the vulnerabilities WMD develop-
ment or use creates for societies. The following paragraphs further 
elaborate on each of these risk factors and their interdependence.  
Figure 1 below summarizes this interplay.     
1. Political and Military Motivations.  Understanding the WMD 
threat involves comprehending why actors may or may not see WMD 
as politically or militarily useful.  During the Cold War, the great 
powers believed that nuclear weapons had great political and military 
utility.16  The two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Un-
 
 16. See generally Lawrence Freedman, The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists, in 
MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY: FROM MACHIAVELLI TO THE NUCLEAR AGE 735 (Peter Pa-
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ion, diverged, however, in the early 1970s on the military utility of 
biological weapons because the United States terminated its offensive 
program while the Soviets accelerated theirs.17  These two examples 
demonstrate why the political and military motivations of actors in in-
ternational relations are critical to gauging the WMD threat. 
The analytical framework presented in this article incorporates 
both state and non-state actors when considering political/military 
motivations for developing or using WMD.  As illustrated by Bush 
administration policy, fears about WMD today involve both states 
and terrorist groups.18  The analytical framework is not, therefore, 
state-centric because it applies to motivations that terrorist groups 
might have in developing or using WMD.  The United States’ Na-
tional Strategy for Combating Terrorism argues that “[m]otivated by 
extreme, even apocalyptic ideologies, some terrorists’ ambitions to in-
flict mayhem seem unlimited.”19  It further cites Osama bin Laden’s 
proclamation that “acquisition of WMD [was] a ‘religious duty.’”20  
One of the significant shifts, discussed later in the article, that con-
tributes to the weakening of the arms control approach is, in fact, the 
perceived rise in the possibility of “catastrophic terrorism”—
terrorism involving WMD.21 
Political and military perspectives on the utility of any weapon 
are, of course, influenced by many factors—the structure and dynam-
ics of the international political system, domestic regime types, psy-
chology of individual leaders, state of weapons technologies, and 
rules of international law.  Particularly important to this article’s 
analysis are the changes witnessed in the structure of the international 
system as it moved from the Cold War to the post–Cold War period.22  
 
ret et al. eds., 1986) (noting that since 1945 “tens of thousands [of nuclear weapons] have been 
accumulated by the major powers and their destructiveness and sophistication increased im-
mensely”). 
 17. See George W. Christopher et al., Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective, 278 
JAMA 412, 415–16 (1997). 
 18. See WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, supra note 4, at 1 (“We will not permit the 
world’s most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world’s most destructive 
weapons.”); see also State of the Union Address, supra note 3, at 135 (“By seeking weapons of 
mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.  They could provide these 
arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred.  They could attack our allies or 
attempt to blackmail the United States.  In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be 
catastrophic.”). 
 19. COMBATING TERRORISM, supra note 5, at 10. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See infra Part III.A. 
 22. See infra Part II.B. 
091504 FIDLER.DOC 10/18/2004  9:56 AM 
46 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 14:39 
The most important changes for purposes of this article are the col-
lapse of the bipolar, nuclearized international system and the devel-
opment of a new system marked by both a single hegemonic actor 
and the rising strategic threat posed by terrorist organizations of 
global scope. 
2. Technological Feasibility.  The second important WMD risk 
factor in the analytical framework is technological feasibility.  This 
risk factor focuses on how technologically difficult WMD are to de-
velop or use.  Of the WMD, nuclear weapons are more technologi-
cally challenging to develop than chemical or biological weapons.23  
Whether the technological feasibility of a particular WMD is difficult 
or easy affects the assessment of the threat posed by such WMD.24  
The Bush administration declared in its National Strategy for Home-
land Security that “[t]he knowledge, technology, and materials 
needed to build weapons of mass destruction are spreading.  These 
capabilities have never been more accessible and the trends are not in 
our favor.”25  The U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism as-
serted that “[t]he availability of critical technologies, the willingness 
of some scientists and others to cooperate with terrorists, and the ease 
of intercontinental transportation enable terrorist organizations to 
more easily acquire, manufacture, deploy, and initiate a WMD attack 
either on U.S. soil or abroad.”26  The perception that WMD develop-
ment is now technologically feasible for states as well as terrorist 
groups contributes significantly to security and foreign policy con-
cerns about WMD.  For example, the fear that terrorist groups may 
 
 23. See ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR 
TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, RAND CORPORATION, FIRST 
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS: I. ASSESSING THE THREAT 21 
(1999), http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2003) [hereinafter 
ASSESSING THE THREAT] (arguing that “[d]eveloping a nuclear weapon requires even greater 
skills, financial resources, and infrastructure” than chemical or biological weapons). 
 24. For example, in assessing the plausibility of nuclear terrorism, Jenkins argued that “the 
notion that some group outside of government programs can design and build a crude nuclear 
bomb is certainly more plausible now than it was 30 or 40 years ago.  At that time, the secrets of 
nuclear fission were closely guarded.  However, much of the requisite technical knowledge has 
since gradually come into the public domain.”  Brian M. Jenkins, Is Nuclear Terrorism Plausi-
ble?, in NUCLEAR TERRORISM: DEFINING THE THREAT 25, 27 (Paul Leventhal & Yonah Alex-
ander eds., 1986). 
 25. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 9 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter HOMELAND SECURITY]. 
 26. COMBATING TERRORISM, supra note 5, at 9–10. 
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develop and use WMD capabilities significantly affects U.S. policy on 
national security,27 WMD,28 and homeland security.29 
3. Social Vulnerability.  The third important WMD risk factor 
in the analytical framework is the level of vulnerability societies face 
when confronted with potential or actual WMD use.  Countries that 
are highly vulnerable to WMD attack will factor such vulnerability 
into their perceptions of the seriousness of the WMD threat.  The at-
tention paid to U.S. vulnerability to terrorist WMD attacks in the de-
velopment of homeland security policy illustrates the importance of 
social vulnerability as a WMD risk factor.30  Conversely, countries not 
highly vulnerable are unlikely to weigh WMD threats as seriously.  
Social vulnerability to WMD use is itself a multi-factored category.  
Key factors include the status of a country in international politics 
(e.g., great power versus least developed country) and the nature of 
its government and society (e.g., open versus closed societies).  Its 
“lone superpower” position and its open, affluent society combine to 
heighten perceptions about the vulnerability of the United States to 
WMD attack.31 
4. Interdependence Among the Risk Factors.  The analytical 
framework stresses the interdependence among the three risk factors.  
None of the risk factors by itself adequately conveys the scope of the 
WMD threat.  The technological feasibility of a weapon influences an 
actor’s perception of that weapon’s political or military utility.  Simi-
larly, strong political motivations to develop a weapon may stimulate 
efforts to overcome technological development challenges the 
weapon presents.  The technological ease with which a chemical or 
biological weapon may be developed and deployed affects how a 
 
 27. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 4, at 6 (noting that “[o]ur immediate 
focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist . . . which attempts to 
gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors”). 
 28. See WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, supra note 4, at 1 (observing that “terrorist 
groups are seeking to acquire WMD with the stated purpose of killing large numbers of our 
people and those of friends and allies”). 
 29. HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 25, at 2 (noting that, in connection with homeland 
security’s objective of defending against terrorism, the United States places special emphasis on 
“preventing, protecting against, and preparing for catastrophic threats,” the greatest risks of 
which come from, among others, WMD). 
 30. See id. at 9 (analyzing U.S. vulnerability to WMD terrorism). 
 31. See id. at 7–10 for discussion of U.S. vulnerability to terrorist attack, including attacks 
using WMD. 
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country views its social vulnerability to the use of such weapon.32  
High social vulnerability to the use of such weapon and high social 
vulnerability of an enemy country may stimulate political and military 
interest in WMD or accentuate the attractiveness of certain WMD 
technologies.  The interdependence among the risk factors does not, 
however, mean that each factor is equally important in every situation 
involving WMD.  Rather, the interdependence suggests that each risk 
factor should be considered in assessing the scope of the threat posed 
by a specific WMD. 
B. The Analytical Framework Applied 
Applying the analytical framework described in Section II.A 
helps give it more specificity and explanatory power.  In this section, I 
use the analytical framework to assess the development of the arms 
control approach to WMD during the pre–Cold War period and the 
Cold War.  My main objective is not to provide a comprehensive his-
tory of the negotiation and adoption of arms control treaties on 
WMD prior to the end of the Cold War; rather, I employ the analyti-
cal framework to sketch why the arms control approach dominated 
international law on WMD in these historical periods. 
1. Pre–Cold War Arms Control on Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion.  As the Introduction indicated, states began applying interna-
tional law directly to what we now call “weapons of mass destruction” 
as early as the late nineteenth century.  In the Hague Declaration 
Concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Projectiles Diffusing As-
phyxiating Gases of 1899 (Hague Declaration), the contracting parties 
agreed “to abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which 
is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.”33  A prohibition 
on Germany’s use and possession of chemical weapons appeared in 
 
 32. See ASSESSING THE THREAT, supra note 23, at 19 (noting the “comparative ease” with 
which low-level chemical and biological attacks could be orchestrated).  For an analysis of the 
differences between making nuclear and biological weapons, see Jonathan B. Tucker, Prevent-
ing the Misuse of Pathogens: The Need for Global Biosecurity Standards, ARMS CONTROL 
TODAY, June 2003, at  http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_06/tucker_june03.asp (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2003).  Although easier to develop than nuclear weapons, making chemical and bio-
logical weapons confronts serious difficulties.  As the National Commission on Terrorism ar-
gued, “[w]hile lethal chemicals are easy to come by, getting large quantities and weaponizing 
them is difficult, and only nation states have succeeded in doing so.”  NATIONAL COMMISSION 
ON TERRORISM, COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 4 
(2000), http://w3.access.gpo.gov/nct/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2003). 
 33. Hague Declaration, supra note 9, at 99. 
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the Treaty of Versailles of 1919,34 and a prohibition on the use of 
chemical weapons appeared in the Treaty in Relation to the Use of 
Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare of 1922,35 which never en-
tered into force.36  States reaffirmed the Hague Declaration’s prohibi-
tion on the use of chemical weapons and expanded the prohibition to 
include bacteriological methods of warfare in the Geneva Protocol 
for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or 
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of 1925 
(Geneva Protocol).37 
Both the Hague Declaration and Geneva Protocol were, how-
ever, limited arms control agreements.  First, neither instrument regu-
lated the ability of a state to develop and stockpile chemical or bio-
logical weapons—the agreements were limited to prohibitions on the 
use of such weapons.38  Second, the prohibition on use in both agree-
 
 34. Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), June 28, 1919, art. 171, 2 Bevans 
43, 119 (“The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials 
or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Ger-
many.  The same applies to materials specially intended for the manufacture, storage and use of 
the said products or devices.”). 
 35. Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, Feb. 6, 1922, 
art. 5, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 67-2, 1922 FOREIGN REL. (1) 267, reprinted in 16 AM. J. INT’L L. 57 
(Supp. 1922), and in A MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ARMS 
CONTROL AGREEMENTS, supra note 9, at 149 (“The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or 
other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by 
the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition on such use having been declared in 
treaties to which a majority of the civilized Powers are parties, [t]he Signatory Powers, to the 
end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as part of international law binding alike 
the conscience and practice of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be 
bound thereby as between themselves and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto.”). 
 36. See A MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ARMS CONTROL 
AGREEMENTS, supra note 9, at 149. 
 37. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 11, 26 U.S.T. at 575, 94 L.N.T.S. at 69 (“That the High 
Contracting Parties . . . accept this prohibition [on the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or 
other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials, and devices], agree to extend this prohibition 
to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves 
according to the terms of this declaration.”). 
 38. See generally Hague Declaration, supra note 9 (“The Contracting Parties agree to ab-
stain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or dele-
terious gases.”) (emphasis added); Geneva Protocol, supra note 11, 26 U.S.T. at 575, 94 L.N.T.S. 
at 69 (“The High Contracting Parties . . . accept this prohibition [on the use in war of asphyxiat-
ing, poisonous or other gases and] agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological 
methods of warfare”) (emphasis added).  See also R.R. Baxter & Thomas Buergenthal, Legal 
Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 853, 855 (1970) (“[The Geneva Pro-
tocol] does not prohibit the production, acquisition, or stockpiling of [chemical and biological] 
weapons . . . . This means, among other things, that the testing of these weapons is not pro-
scribed by the Geneva Protocol; the same is true of the manufacture of equipment capable of 
dispersing them.”). 
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ments was not absolute.  The Hague Declaration’s ban on the use of 
chemical weapons applied only in the case of war between contracting 
parties.39  The ban was not binding if a non-contracting party joined 
the conflict as a belligerent.40  Similarly, the Geneva Protocol’s ban 
applied only in armed conflict between states parties.41  In addition, 
many states parties made reservations declaring that they would not 
be bound by the prohibition in the event that another state party vio-
lated the ban during armed conflict.42  The Geneva Protocol con-
tained, in effect, a prohibition on the first-use of chemical and bio-
logical weapons.43 
Despite this, the adoption of these two international agreements 
on chemical and biological weapons indicates that states during this 
era were sufficiently concerned about the use of such weapons in 
armed conflict.  The analytical framework described in Section II.A 
helps explain the dynamic captured in these international legal docu-
ments.  The prohibitions on use in both the Hague Declaration and 
the Geneva Protocol signal that political/military motivations and 
technological feasibility were sufficiently high to warrant concern 
about the deployment of chemical and biological weapons in armed 
conflict. 
At the time, the technological feasibility of chemical weapons 
was more pronounced than that of biological weapons—as illustrated 
by the extensive use of chemical weapons in World War I44—and the 
legal documents reflect that reality.  Still, the state parties to the Ge-
neva Protocol were concerned enough about the potential develop-
 
 39. Hague Declaration, supra note 9 (“The present Declaration is only binding on the Con-
tracting Powers in the case of a war between two or more of them.”). 
 40. Id. (“It shall cease to be binding from the time when, in a war between the Contracting 
Powers, one of the belligerents shall be joined by a non-Contracting Power.”). 
 41. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 11, 26 U.S.T. at 575, 94 L.N.T.S. at 69  (“[T]he High 
Contracting Parties . . . agree to bound as between themselves according to the terms of this 
declaration.”).  In addition, a number of states parties made reservations providing that the Ge-
neva Protocol was binding on the reserving state only with respect to other states parties.  See 
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 144–46 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 2d ed. rev. 
1989) (listing reservations of states parties to the Geneva Protocol). 
 42. For example, the reservation of France provides: “The said Protocol shall ipso facto 
cease to be binding on the Government of the French Republic in regard to any enemy State 
whose armed forces or whose Allies fail to respect the prohibitions laid down in the Protocol.”  
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 41, at 145. 
 43. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 41, at 138 (noting that the Geneva 
Protocol “is regarded . . . as containing not an absolute prohibition on the use of such weapons, 
but only an agreement not to use such weapons first”). 
 44. HEDLEY BULL, THE CONTROL OF THE ARMS RACE 124 (2d ed. 1965) (describing the 
use of chemical weapons in World War I). 
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ment of biological weapons to prohibit their first-use before the tech-
nological feasibility of such weapons had been clearly demonstrated.45  
The use of chemical weapons during World War I demonstrated that 
political and military leaders had sufficient motivations to develop, 
deploy, and use chemical weapons on a large scale. 
Cutting against these motivations was the principle of the laws of 
war forbidding the use of weapons that caused superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering.46  This principle connected to the realization 
that both armed forces and civilian societies were vulnerable to 
chemical and biological weapon attacks. 
The carnage from chemical weapons on the battlefields of World 
War I demonstrated the military threat posed by these weapons.  Ad-
ditionally, the development of long-range bombardment technologies, 
such as long-range artillery and air power, rendered civilian popula-
tions increasingly vulnerable to the use of chemical and biological 
weapons as they continued to develop technologically.  One of the 
leading air-power theorists of the interwar period, Guilio Douhet, 
based his theory of aggressive air warfare on the assumption that “at-
tacks against population and industrial centers would employ three 
types of bombs—explosive, incendiary, and poison gas . . . .”47  As 
Bull noted, “[t]he belief that gas bombs would be a major element in 
aerial attacks on cities underlay the movement for the prohibition of 
chemical warfare [during the interwar period].  It had a primacy in 
popular imagination as an agent of mass destruction and a product of 
perverted science . . . .”48 
In the period prior to World War II, all three WMD risk factors 
were significantly high, which helps explain why states began to use 
arms control agreements to address the threat posed by chemical and 
biological weapons.  The analytical framework also helps us under-
stand the substantive nature of the international legal rules developed 
on chemical and biological weapons.  As indicated above,49 the prohi-
 
 45. Although the use of disease as a weapon of warfare has a long history, systematic ef-
forts by states to develop biological weapons capabilities only began in the 1930s.  See id. at 127. 
 46. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Evolution of International Humanitarian Law and Arms Con-
trol Agreements, in A MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ARMS 
CONTROL AGREEMENTS, supra note 9, at 1, 21–31 (discussing the prohibition in international 
humanitarian law against weapons that cause unnecessary pain and suffering). 
 47. David MacIsaac, Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists, in THE 
MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY FROM MACHIAVELLI TO THE NUCLEAR AGE, supra note 16, 
at 624, 630. 
 48. BULL, supra note 44, at 124. 
 49. See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text. 
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bitions on use were limited to the first-use of chemical and biological 
weapons—and the agreements did not address development, posses-
sion, stockpiling, transfer, and deployment of such weapons.  States 
could, thus, legally develop, possess, stockpile, transfer, and deploy 
chemical and biological weapons because the arms control agree-
ments did not limit their rights in those contexts.  Such stockpiles of 
chemical and biological weapons served as a deterrent against any 
state’s desire to use chemical and biological weapons first in armed 
conflict.  Under these rules, an illegal first-use of chemical or biologi-
cal weapons could be met legally with response in kind. 
In terms of the analytical framework, political/military motiva-
tions, technological feasibility, and social vulnerability to chemical or 
biological attack were sufficiently high for states to be unwilling to 
rely solely on treaties to protect themselves from attack.  In essence, 
the Hague Declaration and the Geneva Protocol lacked “teeth,”50 
which were provided instead by the policy of deterrence.  Deterrence 
proves successful, however, only when states possess an actual capac-
ity to respond in kind—hence the need to leave development, posses-
sion, stockpiling, transfer, and deployment unregulated under inter-
national law. 
Overall, certain characteristics mark the arms control approach 
found in the Hague Declaration and Geneva Protocol.  First, the ap-
proach is state-centric because the international legal instruments ad-
dress only state behavior.  These agreements are not concerned with 
the possible development and use of chemical or biological weapons 
by non-state actors, such as terrorist groups.  Second, the dynamics of 
the approach reflect a high level of uncertainty and mistrust among 
states because they embody only a first-use prohibition and rely on 
deterrence to control use of chemical and biological weapons.  These 
dynamics reflect the importance that states have placed on military 
power in international politics. 
Third, the reliance on deterrence to uphold the prohibition on 
use contradicted the international legal norm against using weapons 
that caused superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.  The bans on 
chemical and biological weapons found in the Hague Declaration and 
the Geneva Protocol flowed from the acceptance that these weapons 
caused superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering in violation of the 
 
 50. Neither the Hague Declaration nor the Geneva Protocol had any provisions for the 
enforcement of the prohibitions they contained. 
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laws of war;51 yet, states parties to these documents specifically re-
served the right to use such weapons in response to a prior illegal use 
by another state.  The deterrence strategy would not be credible if 
states parties threatened to use chemical or biological weapons and 
were also genuinely committed to complying with the prohibition on 
the use of such weapons in the laws of war. 
Fourth, the arms control approach in this period contained a hi-
erarchy in which states viewed chemical weapons as a greater threat 
than biological weapons, largely because of the more advanced state 
of chemical weapons technologies.  As noted above, the development 
and use of chemical weapons were more advanced than biological 
weapons during this period, illustrated by the Hague Declaration’s 
prohibition of asphyxiating gases in 1899 and the horrors of chemical 
warfare during World War I. 
2. Cold War Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction.  
The arms control approach developed in the pre–Cold War period 
represents the first, rather limited, attempt to regulate WMD through 
international law in the context of the anarchical politics of the inter-
national system.  Although the subject of international legal control, 
the development and use of chemical and biological weapons during 
this period were not central to the dynamics of international politics.  
During the Cold War period, the arms control approach to WMD ex-
panded significantly and became an integral feature of the structure 
and dynamics of international relations.  Key to the growth in the im-
portance of WMD arms control was the development of nuclear 
weapons, a new technology with far more destructive power than ei-
ther chemical or biological weapons. 
A comprehensive summary of the arms control experience of the 
Cold War period is beyond the scope of this article.  Instead, I look at 
the arms control approach through the tripartite analytical framework 
presented above to understand the basic dynamics of WMD control 
in this period.  The lion’s share of international law relating to WMD 
developed in this period addressed nuclear weapons.  The arms con-
trol approach to chemical weapons remained essentially unchanged, 
 
 51. Hague Declaration, supra note 9, at 99 (stating that the signatory powers were inspired 
by the sentiments in the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 on limiting the use of weapons 
that aggravate the suffering of combatants); Geneva Protocol, supra note 11, 26 U.S.T. at  575, 
94 L.N.T.S. at 67 (noting the condemnation of the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases 
“by the general opinion of the civilized world”).  See also BULL, supra note 44, at 129 (arguing 
that “[t]he view that chemical and biological weapons are uniquely immoral is deeply en-
trenched in the folklore of international society”). 
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as no new treaties on such weapons were concluded prior to the end 
of the Cold War.  However, the arms control approach to biological 
weapons underwent an international legal revolution during this pe-
riod.52 
Generally speaking, arms control relating to nuclear weapons 
during the Cold War had two basic objectives: (1) stabilizing nuclear 
deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union and (2) 
limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the international sys-
tem to prevent such proliferation from causing instability and conflict 
among states.  Many treaties designed to advance these two objectives 
appeared during the Cold War, vastly increasing the body of interna-
tional law directly on WMD.  Table 2 provides an overview of key 
Cold War arms control agreements. 
 
Table 2.  
Cold War Arms Control Agreements on Nuclear Weapons 
 
Deterrence Stabilization Limitation on Proliferation 
Nuclear Arms Control Treaties 
between the United States and  
Soviet Union 
Arms Control Treaties on 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons 
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer 
Space and Under Water (1963)53 
 
Treaty between the United States and 
Soviet Union on the Limitation of 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (1972)54 
 
Treaty between the United States and 
the Soviet Union on the Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT 
II)(1979)55 
Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies (1967)58 
 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of 
Tlatelolco) (1968)59 
 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (1968)60 
 
 
 52. See infra notes 76–82 and accompanying text. 
 53. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under 
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 14 U.S.T. 1313.  The United Kingdom is also a party to this 
treaty. 
 54. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti–Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435 [hereinafter ABM Treaty]. 
 55. Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II), June 18, 1979, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., S. EXEC. DOC. Y, 96-1 (1979), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/ 
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Treaty between the United States and 
the Soviet Union on Elimination of 
their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-
Range Missiles (1987)56 
 
Treaty between the United States and 
the Soviet Union on the Limitation of 
Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests 
(1990)57 
Treaty on the Prohibition of the 
Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons 
and Other Weapons of Mass 
Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the 
Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil 
Thereof (1971)61 
 
Agreement Governing the Activities 
of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies (1979)62 
 
South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone 
Treaty (1985)63 
 
African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone 
Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) (1996)64 
 
arms/treaties/salt2-2.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2003); see also Annex: Detailed Analysis of SALT 
II Provisions, 18 I.L.M. 1122.  SALT II never actually entered into force through ratification. 
 56. Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, 
U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. TREATY DOC. 100-11 (1987), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 90 (entered into force June 
1, 1988). 
 57. Treaty between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, July 3, 1974, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. Exec. Doc. 
No. 94-2 (1975), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 906 (entered into force Dec. 11, 1990). 
 58. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 
U.N.T.S. 205. 
 59. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, with Annexed Addi-
tional Protocols (I and II), Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 (entered into force 
Apr. 22, 1968) [hereinafter Treaty of Tlatelolco]; Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco, Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 786, 634 U.N.T.S. 360 (entered into force Dec. 11, 1969); 
Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 754, 634 U.N.T.S. 364 
(entered into force Dec. 11, 1969). 
 60. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970) [hereinafter Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty]. 
 61. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weap-
ons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 
11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, 955 U.N.T.S. 115 (entered into force May 18, 1972). 
 62. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bod-
ies, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1434. 
 63. South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, opened for signature Aug. 6, 1985, 1445 
U.N.T.S. 177, 24 I.L.M. 1440 (entered into force Dec. 11, 1986). 
 64. African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1996, 35 
I.L.M. 698. 
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Nuclear deterrence became a central feature of international re-
lations in the Cold War period.65  The bipolar international system, 
dominated by two ideologically opposed superpowers, created signifi-
cant political/military motivations for the United States and the So-
viet Union to develop, stockpile, and threaten to use nuclear weap-
ons.  Technological developments on nuclear weapons (e.g., multiple 
independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs)) reinforced these 
motivations66 but also provided incentives for the two countries to try, 
through arms control treaties, to stabilize the effect of offensive and 
defensive technological advancements on nuclear deterrence.67  One 
such stabilization effort—the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems of 1972 (ABM Treaty)—restricted the de-
velopment of anti-ballistic missile defenses in order to strengthen nu-
clear deterrence by increasing each superpower’s vulnerability to nu-
clear attack.68 
The non-proliferation efforts undertaken through arms control 
treaties, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,69 represented 
the recognition that more and more countries were acquiring the 
technological means (e.g., through civilian and military nuclear pro-
grams) needed to develop nuclear weapons and that the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons in the international system would be destabiliz-
ing.70  Experience managing the U.S.-Soviet nuclear threats provided 
motivation for many states’ desire to prevent the spread of such prob-
lems throughout the international system.  Proliferation would merely 
exacerbate countries’ sense of vulnerability to nuclear blackmail or 
attack, producing an increasing spiral of proliferation and nuclear 
stalemates throughout the world.  One nuclearized “security di-
lemma” was seen as sufficient.71  In addition, nuclear weapons prolif-
 
 65. For an overview, see Freedman, supra note 16, at 735–78. 
 66. See id. at 774 (“Developments in weapons technology also encouraged the view that 
more sophisticated nuclear tactics were becoming possible.”). 
 67. See id. (arguing that arms control in the 1970s “was bound up with establishing parity 
between the two superpowers”). 
 68. See generally ABM Treaty, supra note 54. 
 69. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 60. 
 70. Darryl Howlett, Nuclear Proliferation, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 415, 431 (John Baylis & Steve Smith eds., 
2d ed. 2001) (noting that “[b]etween 1958 and 1968 there was a greater focus on the dangers 
posed by additional states acquiring nuclear weapons”). 
 71. A debate emerged in the 1980s about whether nuclear proliferation was good or bad.  
Kenneth Waltz began the debate when he argued in 1981 that more nuclear weapons may be 
better for international stability and security.  See KENNETH N. WALTZ, THE SPREAD OF 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS: MORE MAY BE BETTER (Int’l Institute for Strategic Stud., Adelphi Paper 
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eration did not serve the national security interests of either of the 
two superpowers engaged in their titanic bipolar standoff—to the 
contrary these national security interests were the impetus behind the 
creation of political and structural restraints on nuclear prolifera-
tion.72 
Although the arms control approach to nuclear weapons did not 
involve an express first-use prohibition, it mirrored structural and 
substantive features seen in the arms control approach of the pre–
Cold War period.  Structurally, the approach in both historical con-
texts focused on states and their systemic interactions.  Like the 
Hague Declaration and the Geneva Protocol, the nuclear arms con-
trol treaties of the Cold War period do not address non-state actors 
and the potential for nuclear terrorism.73 
Substantively, the arms control approach in both periods relied 
on deterrence to prevent the use of WMD.  In essence, deterrence is a 
self-help strategy that depends on the credibility of the threat to use 
WMD, which itself requires WMD capabilities and stockpiles.  In the 
nuclear weapons context, deterrence was a more complicated strat-
egy, as illustrated by the unique challenges posed to the United States 
and the Soviet Union from advancing technological capabilities in 
 
No. 171, 1981).  The subsequent debate over the effect of nuclear proliferation is discussed in 
THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A DEBATE (Scott D. Sagan & Kenneth N. Waltz eds., 
1995). 
 72. See MCGEORGE BUNDY, DANGER AND SURVIVAL: CHOICES ABOUT THE BOMB IN 
THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS 513–14 (1988) (arguing that decisions not to develop nuclear weapons 
in West Germany, Japan, and communist states in Eastern Europe resulted from external pres-
sure from the superpowers). 
 73. Concerns about nuclear terrorism existed during the Cold War.  Leventhal and Alex-
ander considered the issue in 1986: 
But is nuclear terrorism plausible?  There is no consensus on this issue.  Some observ-
ers see nuclear terrorism as implausible, others see it as possible but not imminent and 
others are convinced it is inevitable . . . . It is generally acknowledged that terrorists 
thus far have been constrained either by a lack of capability, a lack of motivation, or a 
combination of the two.  The key issue is whether these technological and self-imposed 
constraints are eroding as a result of technological and political developments. 
Paul Leventhal & Yonah Alexander, Introduction, in NUCLEAR TERRORISM: DEFINING THE 
THREAT, supra note 24, at 2.  The danger of the malevolent appropriation of nuclear materials 
was recognized in 1979 when the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
was opened for signature.  See Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 
opened for signature Mar. 3, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 96-43 (1980), 1456 U.N.T.S. 101, re-
printed in 18 I.L.M. 1419.  The preamble of this treaty expressed the desire of the states parties 
“to avert the potential dangers posed by the unlawful taking and use of nuclear material” and 
their conviction that “offences relating to nuclear material are a matter of grave concern and 
that there is an urgent need to adopt appropriate and effective measures to ensure the preven-
tion, detection and punishment of such offences.”  Id. pmbl. 
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both defensive and offensive weapons systems.74  To be effective, de-
terrence stability ironically required increasing social vulnerability in 
the face of the developing nuclear threat, as seen in the ABM 
Treaty.75 
The Cold War period also witnessed a major development in 
arms control in connection with biological weapons.  The Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their De-
struction of 1972 (BWC) supplemented the use prohibition in the 
Geneva Protocol by banning the development, production, and 
stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of biological weapons.76  In short, 
states joining the BWC agreed to disarm themselves, at least in the 
context of biological weapons.  The BWC represented a dramatic 
break with the arms control approach for biological weapons that had 
existed from the adoption of the Geneva Protocol.  In the BWC, dis-
armament replaced a first-use prohibition backed by deterrence.  
BWC States Parties did not reserve the right to develop, produce, 
stockpile, or use biological weapons in any circumstances, effectively 
eliminating deterrence as a strategy for biological weapons arms con-
trol. 
Between 1925 and 1972, the technological feasibility of biological 
weapons improved because of scientific progress in understanding 
pathogenic microbes77 and efforts made by governmental biological 
weapons programs.78  The growing technological feasibility of biologi-
cal weapons increased societal vulnerabilities to bioweapons attacks 
because civilian biodefense did not effectively advance during the 
 
 74. See BUNDY, supra note 72, at 549–52 (discussing problems posed by defensive anti-
ballistic missile technologies and offensive technological developments (e.g., MIRVs)). 
 75. See id. at 549–50 (discussing development of U.S. and Soviet positions on restricting 
anti-ballistic missile defenses, which included the argument that “[d]efensive deployments were 
bound to stimulate ever larger and more sophisticated offensive systems on both sides”). 
 76. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, art.1, 
26 U.S.T. 583, 587, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, 166 [hereinafter BWC]. 
 77. LAURIE GARRETT, THE COMING PLAGUE: NEWLY EMERGING DISEASES IN A WORLD 
OUT OF BALANCE 30 (1994) (noting that during the 1950s and 1960s “[n]early every week the 
medical establishment declared another ‘miracle breakthrough’ in humanity’s war with infec-
tious disease”). 
 78. For example, the development of U.S. efforts to develop biological weapons is detailed 
in EDWARD REGIS, THE BIOLOGY OF DOOM: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA’S SECRET GERM 
WARFARE PROJECT (1999) and JUDITH MILLER ET AL., GERMS: BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND 
AMERICA’S SECRET WAR 34–97 (2001). 
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Cold War.79  The combination of increased technological feasibility 
and social vulnerability suggests that the threat of biological weapons 
was growing prior to the adoption of the BWC, which would tend to 
lead states to respond with further reliance on deterrence. 
The key variable explaining the adoption of the BWC was the 
United States’ conclusion, after an extensive review, that biological 
weapons had little, if any, military or political utility, even as a deter-
rent to other states’ biological weapons capabilities.80  Unilaterally, 
the United States terminated its offensive biological weapons pro-
gram.81  In essence, the United States concluded that possession of 
biological weapons by other states, including adversaries, did not pose 
a significant threat to U.S. national security and should be addressed 
through means other than an offensive biological weapons capability. 
This change in political/military motivations in the United States 
converged with the notion, already present as early as 1925, that the 
use of biological weapons was “repugnant to the conscience of man-
kind”82 to produce the WMD arms control breakthrough of the BWC.  
The breakthrough was substantive in moving the arms control strat-
egy on biological weapons from deterrence to disarmament.  Struc-
turally, however, the focus remained state-centric because the BWC 
was limited state biological weapons programs. 
The objective of chemical weapons disarmament also arose dur-
ing the Cold War.  The Preamble to the BWC stated, for example, 
that the BWC States Parties were “[c]onvinced of the importance and 
urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective 
measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using 
chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents.”83  Despite the hope in 
disarmament quarters that the development and possession of chemi-
cal weapons would be banned in the same way as biological weapons, 
 
 79. For background on early biodefense efforts stimulated by fears of Soviet biological 
weapons, see generally Elizabeth Fee & Theodore M. Brown, Preemptive Biopreparedness: Can 
We Learn Anything from History?, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 721 (2001).  William Foege argued 
that the expansion and development of what became the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention began in 1946 “with the desire to improve U.S. military security.”  William Foege, 
Memorandum to the President: Global Health and U.S. National Interests, in BIOLOGICAL 
SECURITY & PUBLIC HEALTH: IN SEARCH OF A GLOBAL TREATMENT: A REPORT FROM THE 
ASPEN STRATEGY GROUP 17, 18 (Kurt M. Campbell & Philip Zelikow eds., 2003). 
 80. On the U.S. renunciation of its offensive biological weapons capability, see generally 
Jonathan B. Tucker, A Farewell to Germs: The U.S. Renunciation of Biological and Toxin War-
fare, INT’L SECURITY, Summer 2002, at 107. 
 81. Id. at 107. 
 82. BWC, supra note 76, pmbl., 26 U.S.T. at 586, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 166. 
 83. Id. 
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this arms control breakthrough did not occur until after the end of the 
Cold War in the form of the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weap-
ons and on Their Destruction of 1993 (CWC).84 
Like the BWC, the CWC seeks disarmament by banning an en-
tire class of WMD.85  The twenty-one year gap between the adoption 
of the BWC and the CWC suggests that states possessing chemical-
weapons capabilities perceived that the political/military utility of 
chemical weapons was not as easily discounted as that of biological 
weapons.  In addition, the critical diplomatic breakthrough following 
the end of the Cold War reinforced the notion that political/military 
motivations for developing and possessing chemical weapons re-
mained sufficiently strong under the structure and dynamics of the 
Cold War international system. 
III.  END OF THE ARMS CONTROL APPROACH?  
POST–COLD WAR CHALLENGES TO  
THE ARMS CONTROL APPROACH TO  
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
The trajectory of the arms control approach on WMD in the 
early years of the post–Cold War period seemed promising.  Biologi-
cal weapons were already outlawed by the BWC.  The CWC had 
been concluded successfully in 1993.  The political and military strain 
of nuclear deterrence eased substantially with the end of superpower 
hostilities, as evidenced by the conclusion of the Strategic Arms Re-
duction Treaty of 1991 (START I)86 and the Strategic Arms Reduc-
tion Treaty of 1993 (START II).87 
Despite its promising post–Cold War start, the arms control ap-
proach could not sustain momentum over the following decade.  In-
stead of receding under the influence of arms control agreements, the 
WMD threat has grown exponentially during the post–Cold War pe-
 
 84. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter 
CWC]. 
 85. See id. art. I, 32 I.L.M at 804. 
 86. Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I), July 
31, 1991, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-20 (1991), reprinted in [1991] 16 U.N. 
DISARMAMENT Y.B. app. II. 
 87. Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), 
Jan. 3, 1993, U.S.-U.S.S.R., S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-1 (1993). 
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riod.88  This growth in the WMD threat has led to questions about the 
utility of the arms control approach in addressing the problem.  In 
this part, I analyze the post–Cold War challenges to the arms control 
approach to WMD by focusing on radical developments affecting the 
risk factors of the WMD threat: political/military motivations; techno-
logical feasibility; and social vulnerability. 
A. Political Revolution, Proliferation Nightmare 
The post–Cold War period has seen a political revolution in 
world politics that has brought to light a WMD “proliferation epi-
demic.”  The political revolution has two features—as the end of the 
Cold War brought the bipolar, superpower international system to an 
end, the threat from terrorism—especially terrorism involving 
WMD—began to loom larger in this new world order.89  Each of these 
developments fed into perceptions about the growing threat of 
WMD. 
As indicated above, the global superpower rivalry and its atten-
dant strategy of nuclear deterrence dominated the Cold War interna-
tional system.90  This system had a WMD logic focused on nuclear 
weapons, stabilization of nuclear deterrence between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, and non-proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons.  While chemical and biological weapons were clearly sideshows 
in the structure and dynamics of the Cold War international system, 
the end of the Cold War saw this WMD logic evaporate. 
First, WMD policy was no longer dominated by stabilizing nu-
clear deterrence between two superpowers.  The primary fear of the 
United States was no longer attack by an ideologically hostile nuclear 
adversary, but rather that the former adversary’s nuclear arsenal 
would fall into the clutches of potential state and non-state prolifera-
 
 88. ASSESSING THE THREAT, supra note 23, at 7 (“Since the end of the Cold War, and es-
pecially in the wake of the New York and Oklahoma City bombings and Aum Shinrikyo attacks 
in Japan . . . there has been a dramatic shift in the perceived threat of CBRN [chemical, biologi-
cal, radiological, and nuclear] terrorism.”); WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, supra note 4, at 
1 (noting in December 2002 that WMD represent one of the greatest security challenges con-
fronting the United States); COMBATING TERRORISM, supra note 5, at 9 (arguing in February 
2003 that “[t]he probability of a terrorist organization using a chemical, biological, radiological, 
or nuclear weapon . . . has increased significantly during the last decade”). 
 89. See, e.g., Ashton Carter et al., Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger, 
FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1998, at 80 (analyzing the new threats perceived to be growing from 
terrorism conducted using WMD). 
 90. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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tors.91  As stated earlier, the arms control approach supported the 
state-focused, rigid nuclear bipolarity of the Cold War by helping sta-
bilize deterrence.92  The utility of this approach dissipated as the in-
ternational system moved into a fluid scenario of multipolar nuclear 
proliferation in which non-state actors played an increasingly visible 
role. 
Proliferation fears overshadowed the revolution in nuclear strat-
egy completed by the United States’ withdrawal from the ABM 
Treaty93 and the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty 
(Moscow Treaty) between the United States and the Russian Federa-
tion.94  While the old bipolar order was characterized by structural 
and political constraints imposed by the superpowers on other states 
interested in developing nuclear weapons, the post–Cold War period 
has seen these constraints disappear, with at least three countries—
India,95 Pakistan,96 and North Korea97—openly demonstrating and/or 
 
 91. Michael Jasinski, Nonproliferation Assistance to Russia and the New Independent States, 
Nuclear Threat Initiative (Aug. 2001, updated Aug. 2002), at http://www.nti.org/e_research/ 
e3_4b.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2003) (“As the political and economic situation in the Soviet 
Union deteriorated in the late 1980s, fears arose that the Soviet government might not be able 
to adequately safeguard its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenals, nor the associated 
materials and know-how.  These fears were intensified by the final break-up of the Soviet Union 
in December 1991, which left nuclear weapons on the territories of four states, and components 
of the Soviet military-industrial complex scattered across the territories of the Newly 
Independent States (NIS).  In the ensuing turmoil, the potential for the loss of weapons, theft of 
nuclear material, or the emigration of weapons scientists to ‘rogue states’ posed a new and 
unprecedented proliferation threat.”). 
 92. HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 415 (5th ed. rev. 1978) (arguing that 
“the United States and the Soviet Union have a common interest in stabilizing the nuclear arms 
race by regulating it” through arms control). 
 93. White House, ABM Treaty Fact Sheet (Dec. 13, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2001/12/20011213-2.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2003) (“Given the emergence of . . . 
new threats to our national security and the imperative of defending against them, the United 
States is today providing formal notification of its withdrawal from the ABM treaty.”). 
 94. Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, May 24, 2002, U.S.-Russ., S. TREATY DOC. 
NO. 107-8 (2002). 
 95. Nuclear Threat Initiative, India Profile, at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/ 
India/index.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2003) (“According to Indian government sources, India is 
capable of building a range of nuclear weapon systems ranging from low yields to 200 kilotons, 
involving fission, boosted-fission, and two-stage thermonuclear designs.”) (ellipsis and quotation 
marks omitted). 
 96. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Pakistan Overview, at http://www.nti.org/e_research/e1_ 
pakistan_1.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2003) (“In 1998, Pakistan commissioned the Khushab re-
search reactor, which is capable of yielding 10–15 kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually.”). 
 97. Nuclear Threat Initiative, North Korea Profile, at http://www.nti.org/e_research/ 
profiles/NK/index.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2003) (“In mid-2002, U.S. intelligence discovered 
that North Korea had been receiving materials from Pakistan for a highly enriched uranium 
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declaring their nuclear capabilities.  The proliferation of nuclear 
weapons to these states focused attention on the weaknesses of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).98  Neither India nor Paki-
stan ever signed this agreement,99 and, although North Korea is a 
NPT state party, it violated the rules stipulated therein before an-
nouncing its formal decision to renounce the treaty.100  The prolifera-
tion nightmare continued as experts believed that other countries, in-
cluding Iran,101 Iraq,102 and Libya,103 were actively seeking to join the 
nuclear club.  The rejection by the United States of the Comprehen-
sive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty104 only added to concerns that state pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons would continue.105 
Proliferation fears also came to haunt the arms control approach 
on biological and chemical weapons in the post–Cold War period.  
The early 1990s witnessed revelations about the size and scale of bio-
logical and chemical weapons programs in the former Soviet Union106 
and Iraq.107  Both states were parties to the BWC yet violated its pro-
hibitions on a massive scale.108  These revelations also exposed the fact 
 
production facility. . . . On 10 January 2003, North Korea declared its withdrawal from the 
NPT.”). 
 98. Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 
U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970) [hereinafter NPT]. 
 99. Nuclear Threat Initiative, India Profile, supra note 95; Nuclear Threat Initiative, Paki-
stan Overview, supra note 96. 
 100. Nuclear Threat Initiative, North Korean Nuclear Program Overview: History and 
Status, supra note 6. 
 101. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Iran Profile, at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/ 
index.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2003). 
 102. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Iraq Profile, at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/ 
iraq/index.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2003). 
 103. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Libya Profile, at http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/ 
libya/index.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2003) (“There remain, however, continuing allegations that 
Libya is indeed pursuing a nuclear weapon capability.”). 
 104. Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, Sept. 24, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-28, 
35 I.L.M. 1439. 
 105. See, e.g., Daryl Kimball, What Went Wrong: Repairing the Damage to the CTBT, ARMS 
CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 1999, at 3, available at www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_12/dkde99.asp 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2003) (describing the events leading up to the U.S. Senate’s rejection of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and suggesting a deleterious impact on U.S. security 
interests). 
 106. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 78, at 165–82 (discussing former Soviet Union’s biologi-
cal weapons program). 
 107. See generally Raymond A. Zilinskas, Iraq’s Biological Weapons: The Past as Future?, 
278 JAMA 418 (1997) (analyzing the status of Iraq’s WMD programs). 
 108. MILLER ET AL., supra note 78, at 167 (noting that the massive Soviet biological weap-
ons program was created one year after the Soviet Union became a party to the Biological 
Weapons Convention of 1972); John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and Interna-
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that the Soviet Union’s perspective on the political/military utility of 
biological weapons ran counter to the conclusion the United States 
had reached in the late 1960s.  Similarly, Iraq had been pursuing a 
biological weapons program for strategic or tactical reasons, again 
suggesting that some regimes saw value in developing and retaining 
an offensive biological weapons program.  Such proliferation of bio-
logical weapons by states underscored the weaknesses of the BWC, 
especially the lack of any compliance or enforcement machinery to 
back up its prohibitions.109 
Second, the arms control approach’s state-centric focus began to 
look increasingly anachronistic as experts began to discuss more ur-
gently the threat of WMD terrorism.110  From 1899 until the end of the 
Cold War, WMD policy concentrated almost exclusively on WMD in 
the hands of states operating under the influence of the anarchical 
structure and dynamics of the international system.  None of the 
WMD arms control agreements reviewed above mentioned, let alone 
addressed, the perceived threat of “catastrophic terrorism”—
terrorism involving WMD, primarily carried out by non-state actors.111  
State proliferation of WMD capabilities produced a radically new en-
vironment affecting political/military motivations for pursuing WMD, 
but the worries about catastrophic terrorism meant that policy mak-
ers also had to assess the political/military motivations of terrorist 
groups in connection with WMD.  Terrorist experts argued that ter-
rorism itself was evolving into forms attracted to tactics and strategies 
designed to destroy and kill on a large scale.112  Large-scale terrorist 
attacks and attempted attacks in the 1990s and early 2000s, capped by 
 
tional Security, Remarks to the Fifth Biological Weapons Convention RevCon Meeting, Ge-
neva, Switzerland (Nov. 19, 2001), at http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/janjuly/6231.htm (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2003) (“After signing the BWC in 1972, Iraq developed, produced, and stockpiled bio-
logical warfare agents and weapons, and continued this activity even after ratifying the BWC in 
1991.  Despite the obligation to fully disclose and destroy its BW [biological weapons] program 
which the UN Security Council required to conclude the Gulf War, Iraq denied having a BW 
program and pursued a policy of obstruction, denial and evasion to conceal its program.”). 
 109. This weakness in the BWC led to negotiations in the 1990s on a verification protocol to 
the BWC.  See Christopher et al., supra note 17, at 415–17. 
 110. See, e.g., FALKENRATH ET AL., supra note 8; TOXIC TERROR: ASSESSING TERRORIST 
USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (Jonathan B. Tucker ed., 2000); Carter et al., 
supra note 89. 
 111. See Carter et al., supra note 89, at 80 (analyzing the threat of catastrophic terrorism). 
 112. On the new terrorism, see generally IAN O. LESSER ET AL., COUNTERING THE NEW 
TERRORISM (1999). 
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the events of September 11, 2001, clearly indicated that the nature of 
terrorism was changing—and becoming more dangerous.113 
The WMD proliferation epidemic, both real and feared, posed 
an even greater crisis when policymakers considered the merging of 
the two proliferation vectors—certain states pursuing WMD capabili-
ties have a history of supporting international terrorism,114 which 
raised the specter of a synergy between state and non-state WMD 
proliferation.  These fears coalesced in the Bush Doctrine’s declara-
tion that the United States would confront national security threats 
from repressive regimes that pursued WMD as well as those that sup-
ported international terrorism.115 
As a result, the dominant structure of the arms control approach 
in the pre–Cold War and Cold War periods—agreements among the 
great powers backed by a strategy of deterrence—no longer seemed 
as relevant.  The repressive regimes targeted by the Bush Doctrine 
(e.g., Iraq, Iran, and North Korea) are not great powers in the classi-
cal sense, and many of them either had not signed the relevant arms 
control treaties or had violated them.  At the same time, the threat of 
WMD terrorism also served to dilute the significance of arms control 
treaties because such treaties address state rather than non-state be-
havior.  U.S. political, economic, and military supremacy in the inter-
national system does not appear to have had sufficient deterrent ef-
fect on either state or terrorist proliferation in WMD. 
B. Technological Transformations, Dual-Use Dilemmas 
Post–Cold War developments signal a technological transforma-
tion that increases the feasibility of WMD development for both 
states and terrorist groups.  In the post–Cold War period, the techno-
logical difficulties of developing WMD are diminishing as relevant 
technologies advance and expertise with such technologies diffuses 
 
 113. See ASSESSING THE THREAT, supra note 23, at vi (“As we stand on the threshold of the 
twenty-first century, the stark reality is that the face and character of terrorism are chang-
ing . . .”); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISM, supra note 32, at 1 (“The terrorist threat is 
changing in ways that make it more dangerous and difficult to counter.”). 
 114. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2001 63–68 (2002), at 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2003) (analyzing state sponsors 
of international terrorism including Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya). 
 115. State of the Union Address, supra note 3, at 135 (“The United States of America will 
not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive 
weapons.”). 
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throughout the world.116  These technological transformations, simply 
put, make development and use of WMD easier than was historically 
possible.  Biological weapons have perhaps featured the most fre-
quently in this discourse because of the rapid developments in ge-
nomics and biotechnology taking place in science and private industry 
today.117 
A central tension that these technological transformations high-
light is the dual-use dilemma that confronts each WMD technology.  
Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons often depend on skills, in-
formation, equipment, and access to precursor materials (e.g., bio-
logical agents, chemicals, uranium) that are widely available and used 
for peaceful, civilian purposes.  Striking a balance between encourag-
ing the use and dissemination of such technologies and the know-how 
to apply them for peaceful purposes while at the same time regulating 
WMD development has proven difficult both within and outside the 
purview of WMD arms control treaties.118 
The dual-use nature of technologies used for WMD also compli-
cates efforts to strengthen arms control regimes through international 
verification mechanisms.  The NPT incorporates safeguard rules and 
verification procedures from the International Atomic Energy 
Agency to facilitate peaceful development of nuclear energy and to 
prevent diversion of technology for building nuclear weapons.119  
Meanwhile, the CWC has a complex international verification system 
operated by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weap-
ons that tries to separate the peaceful from the malevolent in terms of 
 
 116. See, e.g., HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 25, at 9 (noting that the knowledge, tech-
nology, and materials required for building WMD are spreading and have never before been 
more accessible). 
 117. See Carter et al., supra note 89, at 81 (arguing that “the combination of new technology 
and lethal force has made biological weapons at least as deadly as chemical and nuclear alterna-
tives”). 
 118. The problem of the dual-use nature of WMD technologies is apparent in the BWC, 
CWC, and NPT.  Each of these treaty regimes prohibits relevant technologies from being used 
to produce weapons but allows the same technologies to be employed for peaceful purposes.  
Article I, paragraph 1 of the BWC prohibits, for example, the development, production, stock-
piling, acquisition or retention of microbial or other biological agents of types and quantities 
that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes.  BWC, supra 
note 76, art. I, para. 1, 1015 U.N.T.S at 166.  Similar provisions appear in the CWC and NPT.  
See CWC, supra note 84, art. II, paras. 1, 9, 32 I.L.M. at 804–06 (defining chemical weapons as 
toxic chemicals except where intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention and 
defining “purposes not prohibited under the Convention” respectively); NPT, supra note 98, art. 
IV, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172–73 (stating that nothing in the treaty shall affect the inalienable right of 
states parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes). 
 119. See Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 60, art. III, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172. 
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chemical technologies and substances.120  Extensive, but ultimately 
unsuccessful, efforts were made to negotiate a protocol to the BWC 
that would have added an international verification regime for bio-
logical weapons modeled on the CWC system.121  The known and 
feared WMD proliferation among states and non-state actors in the 
post–Cold War period also raises skepticism about the effectiveness 
of arms control treaties in preventing proliferation.  The Bush ad-
ministration’s National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion highlights “counterproliferation” actions that the United States 
can unilaterally take to address the fact that “[t]he possession and in-
creased likelihood of use of WMD by hostile states and terrorists are 
realities of the contemporary security environment.”122 
The analytical framework used in this article also reminds us that 
the more fluid and uncertain nature of political/military motivations 
on WMD and the heightened technological feasibility of developing 
WMD are interdependent.123  Each feeds and reinforces the other.  
President Bush stressed this dynamic when he argued that “[t]he 
gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism 
and technology.”124  This argument identifies the interdependence be-
tween political/military motivations and technological feasibility in 
assessing the WMD threat. 
This interdependent dynamic between political/military motiva-
tions and technological feasibility creates enormous problems for the 
arms control approach because the dynamic (1) makes it easier for 
states to proliferate in violation of their arms control obligations un-
der treaties or customary international law; and (2) bypasses arms 
control agreements entirely in the case of terrorist organizations. 
 
 120. See generally CWC, supra note 84, Annex on Implementation and Verification, 32 
I.L.M. at 824 (establishing system of implementation and verification to ensure use of toxic 
chemicals is for purposes not prohibited under the CWC). 
 121. See, e.g., Rebecca Whitehair & Seth Brugger, BWC Protocol Talks in Geneva Collapse 
Following U.S. Rejection, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 2001, at 26, available at 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_09/bwcsept01.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2003). 
 122. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, supra note 4, at 2.  For a critique of the Bush ad-
ministration’s emphasis on counterproliferation, see John M. Spratt, Jr., Stopping a Dangerous 
Drift in U.S. Arms Control Policy, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Mar. 2003, at 3, 3–4, available at 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_03/spratt_mar03.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2003). 
 123. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 124. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 4, at v. 
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C. Vulnerability Crisis, Preparedness Challenge 
The post–Cold War period has also seen developments that con-
nect to the social vulnerability risk factor of the analytical framework.  
The most important development in this regard has been the height-
ened awareness in many countries—especially the United States—of 
the extent of their societies’ vulnerability to WMD attack, particularly 
to catastrophic terrorism.125  Historically, WMD policy, as illustrated 
by the arms control approach, did not address directly the vulnerabil-
ity that societies face from use of WMD.  The main strategy of states 
has been to deter the use of WMD by other states, which allowed 
governments to avoid focusing much attention and resources on pre-
paring to manage the consequences of WMD attacks.  None of the 
arms control treaties mentioned above address the challenge of do-
mestic preparedness for WMD consequence management following 
WMD events.126 
Concerns about a proliferation epidemic, especially in regard to 
fears about catastrophic terrorism, combined with the perceived 
technological feasibility of WMD development, focused governments’ 
attention increasingly on the social vulnerability risk factor.  Indeed, 
the interdependence of all three risk factors becomes very transpar-
ent at this stage in the analysis.  The perpetration of biological terror-
ism in the United States in the fall of 2001 only accelerated political 
attention and economic resources in the direction of domestic pre-
paredness for WMD events.127  Efforts in the United States on na-
tional missile defense,128 biodefense,129 and homeland security130 reveal 
 
 125. Carter et al., supra note 89, at 81 (arguing that, in the face of WMD, “society is more 
vulnerable”); HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 25, at 7 (“Our population and way of life are 
the source of our Nation’s great strength, but also a source of inherent vulnerability.”). 
 126. During the Cold War, countries did implement civil defense strategies; but these strate-
gies tended not to be accorded the same priority as arms control in connection with policies on 
WMD.  For analysis on civil defense during the Cold War, see generally ANDREW D. 
GROSSMAN, NEITHER DEAD NOR RED: CIVILIAN DEFENSE AND AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR (2001); LAURA MCENANEY, CIVIL DEFENSE 
BEGINS AT HOME: MILITARIZATION MEETS EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE FIFTIES (2000); GUY 
OAKES, THE IMAGINARY WAR: CIVIL DEFENSE AND AMERICAN COLD WAR CULTURE (1994); 
LAWRENCE J. VALE, THE LIMITS OF CIVIL DEFENCE IN THE USA, SWITZERLAND, BRITAIN, 
AND THE SOVIET UNION: THE EVOLUTION OF POLICIES SINCE 1945 (1987). 
 127. See, e.g., HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 25, at 41 (“We must prepare to minimize 
the damage and recover from any future terrorist attacks that may occur despite our best efforts 
at prevention.”). 
 128. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Fact Sheet, Missile Defense and 
Deterrence (Sept. 1, 2001), at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/2001/4891.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 
2003). 
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a sea change in political attitudes with relation to addressing social 
vulnerability as a risk factor in the WMD calculus. 
This sea change contributes to the challenges faced by the arms 
control approach to WMD.  Supporters of arms control agreements 
acknowledge that these instruments do little, if anything, about do-
mestic preparedness for WMD consequence management.  Oppo-
nents go farther, laying blame for the lack of domestic preparedness 
at the feet of the arms control approach.  One such critic fulminated: 
The growing evidence that the U.S. disarmed, while nations that 
might use chemical or biological weapons against us did not, was 
only one of the dangerous absurdities of the arms control delusion.  
The expectation that such weapons had been dealt with through 
these bans contributed to the belief that we need not worry about 
protecting against such scourges.  Our vulnerability to incalculably 
destructive smallpox is a manifestation of the sorry state of Ameri-
can preparedness.131 
D. End of the Arms Control Approach to Weapons of Mass De-
struction 
The political revolutions, technological transformations, and vul-
nerability crises reviewed above have brought an end to relying pre-
dominantly on the arms control approach to address the WMD 
threat.  This argument does not mean that the arms control approach 
and the WMD treaties it has generated have become unimportant or 
worthless.132  However, post–Cold War developments in all the WMD 
risk factors render the arms control approach inadequate to effec-
tively address the contemporary WMD threat.  Since 1899, the domi-
nant international legal strategy on WMD has been the negotiation of 
arms control treaties that ban or regulate the use and development of 
WMD by states.  There is growing awareness, even among its most 
ardent supporters, that the arms control approach faces challenges on 
 
 129. See, e.g., Press Release, White House, President Details Project BioShield (Feb. 3, 
2003), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030203.html (last visited Oct. 4, 
2003). 
 130. See, e.g., HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 25, at 2 (“Homeland security involves a 
systematic, comprehensive, and strategic effort to reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorist 
attack.”); MICHAEL E. O’HANLON ET AL., PROTECTING THE AMERICAN HOMELAND: A 
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS (2002) (analyzing the development of homeland security strategy in 
the United States). 
 131. Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., Delusions of Arms Control, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2002, at B13. 
 132. The Bush administration stresses, for example, that multilateral regimes for arms con-
trol and nonproliferation remain important elements of the overall strategy against WMD.  See 
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, supra note 4, at 4. 
091504 FIDLER.DOC 10/18/2004  9:56 AM 
70 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 14:39 
the political, technological, and social vulnerability fronts that cannot 
be adequately addressed without use of other policy and legal strate-
gies.  This awareness means that we are witnessing, and shall continue 
to see, a diversification in how states, international organizations, and 
non-governmental organizations seek to use international law to deal 
with the WMD threat.  The next part of the article explores this in-
ternational legal diversification. 
IV.  INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE  
NEW WMD ENVIRONMENT 
The diversification of international legal strategies is closely 
linked to policies designed to address the three WMD risk factors in 
the analytical framework.  I organize the analysis of international 
law’s role in the new WMD environment by using the three risk fac-
tors from the analytical framework.  The reader should remember 
that each new international legal strategy discussed connects to the 
interdependence of the risk factors.  In other words, a legal strategy 
designed to reduce political/military motivations for developing or us-
ing WMD also affects, and is affected by, the strategies aimed at ad-
dressing problems associated with the technological feasibility and so-
cial vulnerability risk factors. 
The diversification of international law’s role in WMD matters 
analyzed below does not, however, represent a coherent “grand strat-
egy” for WMD.  These international legal developments have not 
coalesced into any discernable or integrated approach to the growing 
WMD threat.  Further, some of the developments are intensely con-
troversial; and others may never become subjects of diplomatic activ-
ity. 
A. Political/Military Motivations 
International legal diversification appears most clearly in connec-
tion with efforts to affect political/military motivations toward WMD 
development and use.  The arms control approach on chemical and 
biological weapons in the post–Cold War period relied on a first-use 
prohibition backed by deterrence,133 a policy that addressed politi-
cal/military motivations for use but did little to address concerns 
about technological developments and social vulnerabilities.  The 
arms control approach on nuclear weapons in the Cold War period 
 
 133. See supra notes 33–43 and accompanying text. 
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similarly centered on deterring political/military motivations on use.134  
This strategy involved increasing the mutual vulnerabilities of the su-
perpowers to nuclear attack through the ABM Treaty and some ef-
forts to limit the destabilizing effects of new offensive nuclear weap-
ons technologies (e.g., the SALT treaties).  The bans on the 
development and use of chemical and biological weapons rested on 
the assumption that political/military interest in these weapons by 
states would not be strong and, to the extent it remained, could be 
managed through arms control methods other than deterrence (e.g., 
prohibition and verification). 
The international legal developments that connect to the politi-
cal/military motivations risk factor utilize deterrence as the major 
strategic concept, supported by international legal principles and ap-
proaches outside the traditional arms control approach to WMD.  
These developments reflect a belief that the arms control approach 
has not adequately managed the political/military motivations that 
state and non-state actors have for developing and using WMD. 
1. Deterrence of State Actors: Exercising the Right of Self-
Defense.  The problem of WMD proliferation among states in the 
post–Cold War period has raised the policy question of how to de-
crease state interest in WMD.  The most powerful move in this regard 
has been away from the arms control approach toward policies and 
arguments supporting a more robust exercise of the right of self-
defense under international law.  The U.S. termination of the ABM 
Treaty paved the way for the United States to move ahead with plans 
for national missile defense.135  This policy shift is grounded in a 
state’s sovereign right to protect its territory and people from external 
attack, a right recognized by international law.136  The policy shift also 
indicated that the United States does not believe that it can ade-
quately deter potential adversaries only through WMD arms control 
but needs to adopt stronger measures against state actors. 
 
 134. See supra notes 53–73 and accompanying text. 
 135. John R. Bolton, Missile Defense in a New Strategic Environment: Policy, Architecture, 
and International Industrial Cooperation after the ABM Treaty, Remarks to the Fourth RUSI 
Missile Defense Conference (Nov. 18, 2002), at http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/15224.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 4, 2003) (“In the context of our new strategic relationship with Russia, the demise of 
the ABM Treaty has not brought about the dire consequences predicted by many pundits; quite 
the contrary.  The Treaty’s demise instead has been liberating.  It has freed us to explore the full 
range of technologies and architectures to defend against an increasing ballistic missile threat.”). 
 136. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations . . . .”). 
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The second development in the area of the right to self-defense 
and WMD has been the efforts made by the United States to argue 
that customary international law on self-defense provides a legitimate 
justification for preemptive military action against hostile countries 
possessing or developing WMD.137  Such arguments were alive before 
September 11, 2001,138 but became more prominent and influential af-
ter the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.139  The 
U.S. position on its use of force against Iraq in March 2003 was partly 
based on updating the customary doctrine of anticipatory self-defense 
for the threat posed by state adversaries possessing or pursuing 
WMD.140  Even though the United States also defended military ac-
tion against Iraq on the basis of upholding UN Security Council reso-
lutions on Iraqi WMD disarmament,141 the war against Iraq revealed 
the United States’ desire to deploy a doctrine of preemptive self-
 
 137. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 4, at 15 (“We must adapt the concept 
of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.  Rogue states and 
terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. . . . Instead, they rely on acts of 
terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily con-
cealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.”). 
 138. See, e.g., Guy B. Roberts, The Counterproliferation Self-help Paradigm: A Legal Re-
gime for Enforcing the Norm Prohibiting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27 
DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 483 (1999) (proposing a “counterproliferation self-help paradigm” 
to clarify when and how using force in response to the proliferation of WMD is justified). 
 139. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 563, 
565 (2003) (“The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, carried out by Al 
Qaeda operatives trained and led from their bases in Afghanistan, demonstrated the threat 
posed by terrorists who could seek safe haven in rogue nations with potential access to 
WMD.”). 
 140. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 4, at 15 (“The United States has long 
maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national secu-
rity. The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case 
for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and 
place of the enemy’s attack.”); Press Release, White House, President George Bush Discusses 
Iraq in National Press Conference, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 295, 296 (Mar. 6, 2003), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306-8.html (last visited Oct. 
21, 2003) (“Saddam Hussein has a long history of reckless aggression and terrible crimes.  He 
possesses weapons of terror.  He provides funding and training and safe haven to terrorists—
terrorists who would willingly use weapons of mass destruction against America and other 
peace-loving countries.  Saddam Hussein and his weapons are a direct threat to this country, to 
our people, and to all free people.  If the world fails to confront the threat posed by the Iraqi 
regime, refusing to use force, even as a last resort, free nations would assume immense and un-
acceptable risks.  The attacks of September the 11th, 2001, showed what the enemies of Amer-
ica did with four airplanes.  We will not wait to see what terrorists or terrorist states could do 
with weapons of mass destruction.  We are determined to confront threats wherever they arise.  
I will not leave the American people at the mercy of the Iraqi dictator and his weapons.”). 
 141. Sean D. Murphy, Use of Military Force to Disarm Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 419, 427–28 
(2003). 
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defense that would deter states from pursuing WMD and provide the 
United States with a course of action if deterrence failed. 
The U.S. stance on preemptive self-defense under customary in-
ternational law is not universally shared.142  Australian, Spanish, and 
British support for military action against Iraq was premised not on 
an updated doctrine of self-defense under customary international 
law but only on the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions 
on Iraqi disarmament stretching back to 1991.143  But the still ongoing 
debate about the U.S. position on preemptive self-defense in connec-
tion with WMD threats and its impact on the international law on the 
use of force144 illustrates that policy and international legal thinking 
on WMD have moved beyond the arms control approach.  Further 
evidence of this transition away from the arms control approach can 
be found in policy debates about preemptive military strikes against 
North Korean nuclear facilities.145 
The third development in the self-defense context concerns the 
use of force in self-defense against states that harbor terrorists who 
might be planning or who have committed acts of violence against 
another state.  Countries, including the United States, have long ar-
gued that state-sponsored terrorism triggers the right to respond with 
force in self-defense.146  In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 
violence, the international community recognized that the United 
 
 142. See, e.g., Michael White & Patrick Wintour, No Case for Iraq Attack Say Lawyers, 
GUARDIAN, Mar. 7, 2003, at P1 (“Tony Blair last night faced fresh pressure to abandon the 
threat of war against Iraq when 16 eminent academic lawyers warned him that the White House 
doctrine of ‘pre-emptive self-defence’ has no justification under international law.”). 
 143. Murphy, supra note 141, at 427. 
 144. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, FOREIGN AFF., 
May/June 2003, at 16 (arguing that attempts to impose binding international legal obligations on 
the use of force by states through the UN Charter has failed).  Responses to Mr. Glennon’s arti-
cle were published in a section of a later issue of Foreign Affairs, entitled Staying Alive: The 
Rumors of the UN’s Death Have Been Exaggerated.  See Edward C. Luck, The End of an Illu-
sion, FOREIGN AFF., March/Apr. 2003, at 201 (criticizing Glennon for arguing that the Security 
Council is finished); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Misreading the Record, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 
2003, at 202 (attacking Glennon’s argument that the Security Council has failed). 
 145. A discussion of the pros and cons of preemptive military attacks against North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons capabilities are contained in Nuclear Threat Initiative, Option 4: Pre-emptive 
Strikes Against North Korean Nuclear Facilities, at http://www.nti/org/f_wmd411/f2d1_4.html 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2003). 
 146. President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike 
Against Libya, 1 PUB. PAPERS 468, 468–69 (Apr. 14, 1986) (justifying U.S. military action 
against Libya for its acts of state-sponsored terrorism against the United States under the right 
to self-defense in international law); see also Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of 
Libya: An International Legal Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 177 (1987) (analyzing the 
international legality of the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986). 
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States could legally use force in self-defense against Afghanistan be-
cause it was harboring the terrorist groups responsible for the at-
tacks.147  With support from allies, the United States destroyed the 
Taliban government in Afghanistan through military force.  These 
events signaled that the right to use force in self-defense under inter-
national law could be used against states harboring terrorist groups 
that were planning or that had committed acts of violence.  Such an 
interpretation of the right to self-defense should act as a deterrent for 
states in connection with the activities of terrorist groups.  The U.S. 
position on preemptive self-defense links with the “harboring” doc-
trine in an attempt to increase deterrence for state actors in the con-
text of WMD development and possession. 
2. Deterrence of Non-State Actors.  Part of the political revolu-
tion that created the current concerns about WMD involves the rise 
of terrorism as a factor in WMD policy.  The arms control approach 
did not address the political/military motivations that terrorist groups 
might have to develop or use WMD, nor is this international legal 
mechanism well suited for such purposes.  New strategies to increase 
deterrence against WMD terrorism involve (1) militarization of coun-
ter-terrorism efforts and (2) the law enforcement approach of creat-
ing criminal offenses and crafting a system for attribution of—and 
retribution against—perpetrators. 
In the war on terrorism sparked by the violence of September 11, 
2001, the United States has staked out the position that individuals 
suspected of being involved in international terrorist activity can be 
captured and detained as “enemy combatants” who are not entitled 
to the protections of either international humanitarian law or national 
 
 147. For analysis of the impact of the September 11, 2001 violence on the international law 
on the use of force, see generally Antonio Cassesse, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial 
Legal Categories of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993 (2001); Jonathan I. Charney, The 
Use of Force Against Terrorism and International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 835 (2001); Thomas 
M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 839 (2001); Yutaka Arai-
Takahashi, Shifting Boundaries of the Right of Self-Defence—Appraising the Impact of the Sep-
tember 11 Attacks on Jus Ad Bellum, 36 INT’L LAW. 1081 (2002); Michael Byers, Terrorism, the 
Use of Force and International Law after 11 September, 51 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 401 (2002); Mark 
A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymme-
tries of the International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2002); Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of 
Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 539 (2002); Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed 
Attack” in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41 (2002); Steven R. Ratner, Jus 
Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 905 (2002). 
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criminal and constitutional law.148  In November 2001, President Bush 
established military tribunals to try individuals suspected of terrorist 
activity who are not U.S. citizens.149  This military order caused con-
troversy in international legal circles.150  The Bush administration has 
also labeled U.S. citizens suspected of international terrorist activity 
as enemy combatants not entitled to the traditional protections of the 
U.S. Constitution.151  One of these U.S. citizens, Jose Padilla, was al-
leged to have been involved in a plot to detonate a radiological device 
in the United States.152 
These moves by the Bush administration represent a militariza-
tion of counter-terrorism in response to the growing global scale and 
danger posed by international terrorist groups, especially those inter-
ested in WMD.153  Behind this policy is the belief that terrorist organi-
zations of global reach can no longer be handled in the traditional 
manner154 through civilian law enforcement resources and national 
criminal law.155  The utilization of military power in counter-terrorism, 
 
 148. For discussion of this development, see CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 267–73 (2003). 
 149. Military Order, Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, § 4, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (2001). 
 150. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists?: A 
Qualified Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Guan-
tanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 591, 592 (2002); Harold Hongju Koh, The 
Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 337 (2002); Daryl A. Mundis, The Use of 
Military Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 320, 
324–25 (2002); Diane F. Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes to War: 
Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 659–63 
(2002). 
 151. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003); Padilla ex rel. Newman v. 
Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 152. Padilla ex rel. Newman, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 572–73. 
 153. See COMBATING TERRORISM, supra note 5, at 15 (“Preventing terrorist groups from 
gaining access to technology, particularly that which supports WMD, will be one of our highest 
priorities.”). 
 154. Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., The Use of Armed Force Against Terrorism: American Hegem-
ony or Impotence?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 37, 39 (2000) (observing that “the international community 
has taken a piecemeal approach and addressed the problem of international terrorism by identi-
fying particular criminal acts inherently terrorist in nature to be prevented and punished by do-
mestic law.  The result has been the adoption of a number of global treaties, regional conven-
tions, and bilateral agreements which are relevant to the suppression of international terrorism, 
and corresponding domestic laws which implement those arrangements.”). 
 155. Abraham D. Sofaer, Playing Games with Terrorists, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 903, 903 
(2002) (“For many years, between 1988 and September 11, 2001, presidents denounced terrorist 
attacks on Americans and promised to ‘pursue’ attackers until they were ‘brought to justice.’  
These turned out to be empty words.  Rather than use the military to put an end to the groups 
we knew were responsible, presidents used the FBI to investigate, to develop evidence, and then 
to pursue through the criminal process those low-level operatives that we were fortunate 
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under robust notions of the right to use force in self-defense,156 is part 
of the Bush administration’s strategy to contain and then roll-back 
terrorism so that eventually it will again be a problem manageable in 
the traditional domain of law enforcement.157  The militarization of 
counter-terrorism has brought areas of international law into WMD 
policy that previously were not an issue, such as the treatment of en-
emy combatants under international humanitarian law. 
Although the traditional law enforcement approach to terrorism 
is, in the opinion of the United States, inadequate, it has not been 
abandoned in the development of strategies to counter WMD.  
Rather, the law enforcement approach to WMD terrorism builds on a 
body of international law on terrorism crafted over the course of 
thirty years.158  Antiterrorism treaties did not specifically begin to in-
corporate WMD terrorism until the 1990s, which reflects the growth 
of concern about the possibility of catastrophic terrorism.  In 1998, 
WMD terrorism featured in the adoption of the UN Convention on 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings159 and the proposed draft UN 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.160 
The UN Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 
broadly defines “explosive or other lethal device” to include “[a] 
weapon or device that is designed, or has the capability, to cause 
death, serious bodily injury or substantial material damage through 
the release, dissemination or impact of toxic chemicals, biological 
agents or toxins or similar substances or radiation or radioactive ma-
terial.”161  This convention then follows the standard law enforcement 
approach found in previous antiterrorism treaties: states parties 
criminalize certain offenses,162 take jurisdiction over the commission 
 
enough to arrest.  This policy of dealing with the terrorist threat allowed Osama bin Laden and 
his leadership, and the Taliban Government that gave them sanctuary, time to plan, prepare, 
and implement new attacks of increasing seriousness, with impunity.”). 
 156. See supra notes 137–145 and accompanying text. 
 157. See COMBATING TERRORISM, supra note 5, at 2. 
 158. See generally TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rosalyn Higgins & Maurice 
Flory eds., 1997).  For treaties on international terrorism, see INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: 
MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS (1937–2001) (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2001). 
 159. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res. 52/164, 
U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., 72d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (1997). 
 160. Draft International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, U.N. 
GAOR 6th Comm., 53d Sess., Annex 1, Agenda Item 155, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/53/L.4 (1998). 
 161. United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 
supra note 159, art. 1.3(b). 
 162. Id. arts. 2, 4. 
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of such acts,163 agree to prosecute or extradite alleged perpetrators,164 
and participate in law enforcement cooperation and assistance.165  The 
objective is to increase the potential that terrorist acts will be pun-
ished and thus deter terrorist activity. 
A second development involving the law enforcement approach 
is the U.S. policy of building on existing counter-terrorism treaties to 
create “new, strict standards for all states to meet in the global war 
against terrorism.”166  The United States points to UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001, as creating international 
legal obligations on all UN members in connection with the global 
fight against terrorism.167  Enacted pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, UN Security Council Resolution 1373 contains numerous 
obligations on UN member states relating to combating terrorism.168  
Experts on national security and arms control referred to Resolution 
1373 as making “instant global law” that will be monitored by a 
Committee Concerning Counter-Terrorism.169  By combining the 
standards that exist in counter-terrorism treaties and the duties con-
tained in UN Security Council Resolution 1373, the United States 
hopes to establish a baseline level of international legal responsibility 
for states in the fight against terrorism.170 
A third development involving the law enforcement approach 
involves proposals to criminalize the development, possession, and 
use of biological and chemical weapons.  The most well-known pro-
posal in this area is the Harvard/Sussex Draft Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Developing, Producing, Ac-
quiring, Stockpiling, Retaining, Transferring or Using Biological or 
Chemical Weapons.171  This proposal seeks to make developing, pro-
 
 163. Id. art. 6. 
 164. Id. art. 8. 
 165. Id. art. 10. 
 166. COMBATING TERRORISM, supra note 5, at 18. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001); 
COMBATING TERRORISM, supra note 5, at 18–19 (“The resolution calls upon all member states 
to cooperate to prevent terrorist attacks through a spectrum of activities, including suppression 
and freezing terrorist financing, prohibiting their nationals from financially supporting terrorists, 
denying safe haven, and taking steps to prevent the movement of terrorists.”). 
 169. John R. Burroughs et al., Arms Control and National Security, 36 INT’L LAW. 471, 487 
(2002). 
 170. COMBATING TERRORISM, supra note 5, at 18–19. 
 171. Matthew Meselson & Julian Robinson, Harvard/Sussex Program on CBW Armament 
and Arms Limitation, Draft Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of De-
veloping, Producing, Acquiring, Stockpiling, Retaining, Transferring or using Biological or 
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ducing, acquiring, stockpiling, retaining, or transferring any chemical 
or biological weapon a criminal offense.172  The draft convention then 
requires states parties to take jurisdiction over such offenses,173 either 
prosecute or extradite people alleged to have committed such 
crimes,174 and engage in law enforcement cooperation and assis-
tance.175  This proposal seeks to transform the ban on chemical and 
biological weapons applicable to governments into a criminal process 
that seeks to deter and punish individuals who participate in chemical 
or biological weaponeering.  Such a criminal process would apply to 
individuals who are government officials or terrorists.176  Targeting in-
dividuals in the manner the Harvard/Sussex proposal envisions re-
veals the differences between the law enforcement approach and the 
traditional arms control approach. 
Barry Kellman has also prominently advocated using an interna-
tional criminal law approach to address the threat of bioterrorism.  
Kellman argues that, although the arms control approach and an ap-
proach based on criminal law enforcement are not inherently contra-
dictory or mutually exclusive, their paths diverge substantially.177  
Kellman asserts that the problem of bioterrorism “shares more char-
acteristics with illicit smuggling operations than with state weapons 
development programs,” meaning that “anti-bioterrorism efforts 
should be directed at denying necessary materials and equipment to 
bioterrorists and at interdicting their networks before there is an at-
tack.”178  Kellman’s international criminal law approach to bioterror-
ism contains four categories of initiatives: 
(1) criminalization of both the use of biological agents and unau-
thorized possession of pathogenic agents; (2) regulation of posses-
sion and transfer of pathogenic agents, including oversight of basic 
bio-research and tracking of sophisticated weaponization equip-
ment; (3) anti-smuggling initiatives, including authority to under-
take investigations; and (4) empowerment of an institution capable 
of directing the entire set of efforts.179 
 
Chemical Weapons (Nov. 1, 2001), at http://fas-www.harvard.edu/~hsp/crim01.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2003). 
 172. See id. art. I. 
 173. See id. art. V. 
 174. See id. art. VII. 
 175. See id. art. IX. 
 176. See id. art. I, para. 1 (stating that “any person commits an offence” who engages in ac-
tivity prohibited by the Convention) (emphasis added). 
 177. Kellman, supra note 12, at 721–22. 
 178. Id. at 730. 
 179. Id. 
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B. Technological Feasibility 
The perceived increase in the technological feasibility of WMD 
development has contributed to the growth of concerns about WMD 
proliferation by state and non-state actors.180  The arms control ap-
proach to nuclear weapons included limitations on the superpowers 
developing defensive anti-ballistic missile technologies181 and controls 
on the deployment of certain offensive nuclear weapons technolo-
gies.182  The bans on biological and chemical weapons rested on the 
assumption that governments would not turn to these WMD even 
though science made such weapons easier to develop and deploy.  
The technological feasibility risk factor has become more important 
in WMD policy because of the fluidity and uncertainty of WMD poli-
tics after the end of the Cold War and the rise of “new terrorism.” 
The most prominent response developed to address the growing 
technological feasibility risk involves national efforts to tighten con-
trols on access to and transfer of matériel necessary to make WMD.183  
Existing examples of this policy response do not involve the direct use 
of international law, such as the negotiation of treaties.  The United 
States has, for example, worked bilaterally with Russia to secure for-
mer Soviet nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons facilities to en-
sure that Soviet WMD technologies do not proliferate.184  The Group 
of Eight Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Ma-
terials of Mass Destruction, established in June 2002, seeks to en-
hance the security of WMD technologies in the former Soviet Union 
through securing WMD matériel, employing former Soviet weapon-
eers, enhancing export controls, and strengthening border security.185  
 
 180. See supra notes 116–124 and accompanying text. 
 181. See, e.g., ABM Treaty, supra note 54. 
 182. See, e.g., SALT II, supra note 55. 
 183. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (2001); Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 
2002, Pub. L. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594, Title II. 
 184. See Jasinski, supra note 91. 
 185. See generally Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: G-8 Summit—Preventing the 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (June 27, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2002/06/20020627-7.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2003); see also ROBERT J. EINHORN 
& MICHÈLE A. FLOURNOY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS), 
PROTECTING AGAINST THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS: 
AN ACTION AGENDA FOR THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP (2003) (making recommendations to 
take the Group of Eight Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruc-
tion from financial commitments to implementation of projects). 
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The members of the Australia Group have tightened export control 
measures on items that could be used to produce WMD.186 
The United States and other countries have undertaken to 
strengthen their national laws on security of WMD items, such as bio-
logical agents.187  These policy initiatives connect with international 
law through proposals made by governments and non-governmental 
experts for international legal action on biosecurity.  As alternatives 
to the rejected Protocol to the BWC, the Bush administration advo-
cated that BWC States Parties should (1) establish sound national 
oversight mechanisms for the security and genetic engineering of 
pathogenic organisms; (2) devise a solid framework for bioscientists 
in the form of a code of ethical conduct that would have universal 
recognition; and (3) promote responsible conduct in the study, use, 
modification, and shipment of pathogenic organisms.188  The British 
government connected these ideas to international law by proposing a 
Convention on Physical Protection of Dangerous Pathogens.189  Non-
governmental experts also called for a Biosecurity Convention to im-
prove the safety and security of pathogenic microbes in the face of 
WMD proliferation and terrorism.190  Steinbruner and Harris have ar-
gued for an international oversight arrangement to ensure that ad-
vanced biological research does not contribute intentionally or unin-
tentionally to the development of dangerous pathogens.191 
Although the likelihood of a new biosecurity treaty or other new 
international legal arrangements is uncertain, international coopera-
tion on biosecurity as part of the future BWC process was an outcome 
 
 186. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Fact Sheet: U.S. Efforts to Combat the Biological Weapons 
Threat, Nov. 14, 2002, at http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/15150.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2003). 
 187. See id. 
 188. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, President’s Statement on Biological Weapons: 
Strengthening the International Regime against Biological Weapons (Nov. 1, 2001), at 
http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/2001/7907.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2003). 
 189. See SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, 
STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION: COUNTERING THE 
THREAT FROM BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, Apr. 2002, at 3, at http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/ 
sbtwc/other/fcobw.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2003). 
 190. See Jonathan B. Tucker & Raymond A. Zilinskas, Assessing U.S. Proposals to 
Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Apr. 2002, at 10, 11, 
available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_04/tuczilapril02.asp (arguing that “the United 
States should propose that the UN General Assembly adopt a ‘Biosecurity Convention’ requir-
ing countries to follow uniform guidelines for who is given access to dangerous pathogens, as 
well as universal standards of physical security for those institutions authorized to work with 
them”). 
 191. See generally John D. Steinbruner & Elisa D. Harris, Controlling Dangerous Pathogens, 
ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Spring 2003, at 47. 
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of the Fifth Review Conference in November 2002.192  In August 2003, 
BWC States Parties discussed national mechanisms to strengthen se-
curity and oversight of pathogenic agents to prevent them from falling 
into the wrong hands.193  In this respect, BWC States Parties are 
adapting the arms control approach for the new political and techno-
logical realities of biological weapons.  As the United Nations indi-
cated in a press release before the Fifth BWC Review Conference, 
the BWC process has to recognize the “rapid progress being made in 
the bio-sciences, progress which as well as developing important 
benefits also makes it potentially easier to develop biological weap-
ons.”194  Whether international cooperation on biosecurity through 
the BWC process agreed upon at the Fifth Review Conference leads 
to new treaty law remains to be seen. 
C. Social Vulnerability 
As analyzed in Part III, the growing awareness of the social vul-
nerability to WMD attacks has contributed to mounting concerns 
about WMD proliferation.  The arms control approach contains little, 
if anything, that addresses the social vulnerability risk factor.  Histori-
cally, addressing such vulnerability has remained predominantly at 
the national level, as illustrated by various national civil defense pro-
grams created to deal with the effects of nuclear attack.195  Contempo-
rary policy appears to be following the same pattern because national 
policy and law dominate the growing movement toward domestic 
preparedness for WMD attacks.  The United States is, for example, 
mounting a significant homeland security effort that includes large-
 
 192. On the Fifth Review Conference, see Marie Isabelle Chevrier, Waiting for Godot or 
Saving the Show? The BWC Review Conference Reaches Modest Agreement, DISARMAMENT 
DIPLOMACY, Dec. 2002–Jan. 2003, at 11, available at  http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd68/ 
68bwc.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003); Graham S. Pearson, Report from Geneva: The Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference, CBW CONVENTIONS BULLETIN, No. 58, 
Dec. 2002, at 19, http://fas-www.harvard.edu/~hsp/bulletin/cbwcb58.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 
2003). 
 193. See Report of the Meeting of Experts (Part I), Fifth Review Conference of the States 
Parties of the BWC, BWC/CONF. Doc. BWC/MSP.2003/MX/4 (Part I) (Sept. 18, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.opbw.org/new_process/mx4_I.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2003) (reporting on 
the Meeting of Experts held from Aug. 18–29, 2003, on consideration of the adoption of neces-
sary national measures to implement BWC prohibitions). 
 194. Press Release, United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of Biological Weapons Con-
vention to Resume in Geneva from 11–22 November (Nov. 6, 2002), U.N. Doc. DC/2847, at 
www.un.org/news/Press/docs/2002/dc2847.doc.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2003). 
 195. See supra note 126. 
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scale efforts to prepare the United States homeland for WMD terror-
ism.196 
International cooperation on reducing social vulnerabilities is, 
however, emerging.  The United States is proposing to support the 
strengthening of the international community’s capacity for WMD 
defense and preparedness by improving mechanisms for early detec-
tion, diagnosis, and the mitigation of health threats posed by chemical 
and biological terrorism.197  Multilateral forums in which preparedness 
for chemical and biological terrorism has been discussed include, for 
example, NATO, the World Health Organization, the Ottawa Group, 
the World Customs Organization, and the International Maritime 
Organization.198  Some of the ideas discussed in these groups, such as 
the creation of a global smallpox vaccine reserve199 and regulations to 
enhance ship and port security against possible WMD terrorism,200 
may require formal international legal activities, leading to the craft-
ing of new international law specially directed toward reducing social 
vulnerability to WMD attacks.  Such international legal developments 
would be further evidence that international policy and law on WMD 
have moved beyond the arms control approach. 
D. From the Arms Control Approach to a Trifurcated Strategy 
The international legal developments, proposals, and ideas ana-
lyzed above suggest that WMD policy is moving from a dominant role 
for the arms control approach to a three-part strategy.  Figure 2 pro-
vides an overview of this trifurcated strategy.  The first part involves 
international law that addresses WMD threats presented by states.  
This “international security” framework includes not only the arms 
control treaties but also the moves to draw on the right of self-defense 
to address WMD threats from state actors. 
The second part comprises international law that attempts to  
address WMD threats posed by non-state actors, namely terrorists.  
This “global security” framework is integrated into the anti-WMD ef-
fort the law enforcement model developed in antiterrorism treaties.  
Multilateral antiterrorism treaties, specifically including WMD 
threats and bilateral extradition treaties, form the heart of this 
 
 196. See HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 25, at 41–45. 
 197. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Fact Sheet: U.S. Efforts to Combat the Biological Weapons 
Threat, supra note 186. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. 
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framework.  The “global security” framework also includes efforts to 
use international law to improve the safety and security of WMD 
agents and equipment to ensure that state or non-state proliferators 
do not gain access to them.  Finally, the framework incorporates mili-
tary responses to terrorist threats. 
The third part of the trifurcated strategy focuses on domestic de-
fense against and preparedness for WMD events.  This “homeland 
security” framework is taking shape through international coopera-
tive efforts on improving domestic readiness for WMD attacks against 
vulnerable societies.  Whether the source of such attacks is a state or 
non-state actor is less relevant in this framework than preparing so-
cieties for the consequences of WMD events.  International law in the 
homeland security framework is less developed than the other two 
pieces of the trifurcated strategy, but developments indicate that this 
area may be one of growth in the future. 
 
091504 FIDLER.DOC 10/18/2004  9:56 AM 
84 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 14:39 
From the Arms Control Approach to a Trifurcated Strategy 
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V.  CONCLUSION: THE END OF THE ARMS CONTROL 
APPROACH AND ITS IMPLICATIONS  
FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW ON  
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
The end of the arms control approach as the leading interna-
tional legal strategy against WMD carries deeper implications for in-
ternational law than the process of diversification and the trifurcated 
strategy reviewed in Part IV.  One such implication involves ques-
tions about the future of the arms control approach.  The focus in the 
context of nuclear weapons has shifted from the stabilization of bipo-
lar deterrence to the problem of multipolar proliferation of nuclear 
weapons technologies and ambitions among states and non-state ac-
tors.  The proliferation concern has exposed the two basic weaknesses 
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: (1) state proliferators either 
are not bound by the treaty or they violate it without fear of sanction 
under the treaty regime; and (2) the treaty does not directly address 
the threat of nuclear terrorism carried out by non-state actors. 
The continuing crisis over North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear 
weapons reflects well the argument that the arms control approach’s 
dominance in WMD policy is over.  Neither the NPT nor the 1994 
Agreed Framework201 between the United States and North Korea 
has deterred Pyongyang from pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.  
The United States was on the brink of war with North Korea in 1994 
over Pyongyang’s push for nuclear weapons,202 and it is not yet clear 
how the current crisis will be resolved—through multilateral diplo-
macy or preemptive military action by the United States. 
In August 2003, North Korea agreed to participate in multilateral 
talks with the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, and Rus-
sia.203  Prior to the talks, China was not holding out much hope for 
significant progress,204 leaving the option of preemptive military action 
 
 201. Under the Agreed Framework concluded in October 1994, “North Korea agreed to 
shut down its plutonium-based nuclear reactor and related facilities, and the United States 
agreed to provide two proliferation-resistant reactors and supply North Korea with heating oil 
while the reactors were under construction.”  Nuclear Weapons on the Korean Peninsula, ARMS 
CONTROL TODAY, May 2003, at 3, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_05/ 
nkoreaintro_may03.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2003). 
 202. See James T. Laney & Jason T. Shaplen, How to Deal with North Korea, FOREIGN 
AFF., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 16, 23 (2003). 
 203. Let’s All Six of Us Talk About It, ECONOMIST, Aug. 9, 2003, at 33, available at 2003 WL 
58583522. 
 204. See id. 
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on the table.205  According to the U.S. State Department, these multi-
lateral talks did not go well.206  In October 2003, North Korea agreed 
to return to the negotiating table two weeks after President Bush in-
dicated a willingness to “extend a written, multilateral security 
agreement to North Korea in exchange for a complete dismantling of 
its nuclear weapons program.”207  The same volatile mixture of multi-
lateral approaches and potential military action has characterized the 
crisis over Iran’s alleged pursuit of nuclear weapons.208 
Concerns about the future of the arms control approach in the 
context of chemical and biological weapons also abound.  Although 
the CWC regime is functioning, many problems—including a lack of 
resources, failure of CWC States Parties to comply, and leadership 
controversies—cloud the implementation of the CWC’s prohibitions 
and verification system.209  New threats to the CWC’s main normative 
objective of banning chemical weapons have appeared in the form of 
so-called “non-lethal” chemical weapons.210  The first few years of the 
CWC’s implementation have not sufficiently alleviated concerns 
about the proliferation of chemical weapons among states and non-
 
 205. North Korea Capitulates: Hardline Pressure Works, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 14, 2003, 
at 6, available at 2003 WL-FEER 59146994 (noting the U.S. position that it would not let the 
nuclear situation in North Korea stand, indicating “a willingness to make military strikes just 
short of outright war”). 
 206. See John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, 
Remarks to the Bruges Group, London, United Kingdom (Oct. 30, 2003), at 
http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/25752.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003) (“During the August six-
party talks in Beijing, the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea emphasized 
that the Korean Peninsula must be free of nuclear weapons.  North Korea further isolated itself 
by threatening provocative actions such as nuclear tests—adding to threats it made in April that 
it might build more nuclear weapons and perhaps even transfer nuclear material or weapons to 
third parties.”). 
 207. See Anthony Faiola, N. Korea Agrees to Resume Nuclear Talks; U.S. Reacts Coolly to 
Demand for ‘Simultaneous Actions’, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2003, at A18. 
 208. See Douglas Frantz, Iran Closes in on Ability to Build a Nuclear Bomb, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 4, 2003, at A1.  In late October 2003, Iran reached an agreement with France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom to stop enriching uranium and to provide documents to the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency, thus easing tensions over U.S. allegations that Iran is secretly 
developing nuclear weapons.  See Joby Warrick, Iran Still Has Nuclear Deadline, U.S. Says, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2003, at A18. 
 209. On the challenges facing the CWC, see Ian R. Kenyon, The Chemical Weapons Con-
vention and the OPCW: The Challenges of the 21st Century, CBW CONVENTIONS BULLETIN, 
No. 56, June 2002, at 1, http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hsp/bulletin/cbwcb56.pdf (last visited Nov. 
10, 2003). 
 210. See, e.g., WORKING GROUP ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, FEDERATION OF AMERICAN 
SCIENTISTS, NON-LETHAL CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (Nov. 2002), http://www. 
fas.org/bwc/papers/nonlethalCBW.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). 
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state actors, forcing the development of new policies and legal strate-
gies on chemical weapons and chemical terrorism. 
The arms control approach also suffered a beating in the context 
of the BWC, in the form of the United States’ rejection in 2001 of a 
verification protocol that had been years in the making.211  The death 
of the verification protocol left the arms control approach with only a 
weak treaty to confront perhaps the most difficult WMD proliferation 
and terrorism challenge.212  Although the BWC Fifth Review Confer-
ence did not end in disaster,213 the arms control approach on biologi-
cal weapons remains in serious trouble. 
The political, technological, and vulnerability challenges to the 
arms control approach have created a crisis of confidence in its utility.  
The arms control approach and the treaties it has generated remain 
necessary but are no longer sufficient (or even in some respects rele-
vant) to address the threat currently posed by WMD proliferation 
and terrorism.  Arms control supporters favor new international legal 
strategies and global civil society action to address the political, tech-
nological, and vulnerability problems that WMD create today.  Arms 
control skeptics see the crisis of confidence in the arms control ap-
proach as evidence that the approach itself is a flawed sideshow, at 
best, and a dangerous delusion, at worst. 
Beneath the controversy surrounding the arms control approach 
to WMD stirs a larger debate about the role of international law in 
world politics.  Does the end of the arms control approach signal a 
loss of faith in the utility of international law in international politics?  
Is the diversification of international legal strategies and ideas on 
dealing with WMD merely, to paraphrase Bull, “anything more than 
[a] heightened protest against the facts of international politics?”214  
This international legal debate has an analogue in international rela-
tions theory in disagreements between realists and institutionalists 
about the contributions institutions and regimes, such as arms control 
treaties, make to national security and the prevention of conflict.215 
 
 211. See Whitehair & Brugger, supra note 121. 
 212. Burroughs et al., supra note 169, at 505 (“The utter breakdown of the Biological 
Weapons Convention does not bode well for international controls over these weapons.”). 
 213. See Chevrier, supra note 192; Pearson, supra note 192, at 19. 
 214. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD 
POLITICS 151 (1977). 
 215. See John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, INT’L 
SECURITY, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1994–95, at 5, 16 (1994) (arguing that institutionalism pays 
“little attention to the security realm, where questions about war and peace are of central im-
portance”).  But see Robert O. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist The-
091504 FIDLER.DOC 10/18/2004  9:56 AM 
88 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 14:39 
Pursuing these larger theoretical controversies in international 
law and international relations is beyond the scope of this article, but 
I mention them because the political, technological, and vulnerability 
challenges currently undermining the arms control approach connect 
to deeper concerns about the nature of international politics and in-
ternational law’s role therein.  On the one hand, the emerging trifur-
cated strategy suggests that international law’s role in the effort to 
control WMD remains critical, even with the end of the arms control 
approach.  On the other hand, the same strategy perhaps indicates 
that the WMD threat may be pushing past the point at which states, 
international organizations, and non-governmental actors can effec-
tively use international law to deter, defend, or disarm.  The need for 
international law in the WMD context may be higher now than in 
previous historical periods.  The dangers and uncertainties confront-
ing the use of international law in this new WMD environment may 
also be historically unprecedented, casting ominous shadows over in-
ternational legal endeavors against WMD for the foreseeable future. 
 
ory, INT’L SECURITY, Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995, at 39, 43 (1995) (arguing that institutionalist 
theory is relevant to the study of security affairs). 
